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With the interconnection of services and customers, network attacks are now
capable of large amounts of damage. Defending against these attacks is dif-
ficult, especially with an asymmetric disadvantage between defender and
attacker. Flexible Random Virtual internet protocol Multiplexing (FRVM)
is a moving target defence technique that protects against reconnaissance
and access with address mutation and multiplexing. By deploying FRVM
on a Mininet network, this thesis demonstrated its security and performance
trade-off. Address mutation and multiplexing can largely increase the dura-
tion of network scans and obfuscate the results. Additionally, address mul-
tiplexing is inexpensive in terms of performance. These could drive future
research to include address mutation and multiplexing. Finally, the method-
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As the digital world has developed and grown, it has increasingly become in-
tegrated into our society and lives. Though this progression important data
and services, such as personal data, trade secrets, and financial and emer-
gency services, have been migrated to the Internet [3]. During this time, the
criminals that sought to wreak havoc and gain personal wealth outside of the
digital world have followed suit. In the digital world, these criminals have
been labelled attackers, or adversaries. Network security plays a vital role in
the digital world to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
data and services against the threats posed by attackers [45]. A magnitude of
past and ongoing research has been conducted to fortify networks, attempt-
ing to make them impenetrable to attackers; however, attackers continue to
either break down or squeeze through a hidden hole in built-up security [46].
This is because the attackers have an asymmetric advantage against defend-
ers [49]; the defences remain static, but the threats can morph as an attacker
learns more about the unchanging defences and its weaknesses. Moving Tar-
get Defence (MTD) was designed to level the playing field by modifying the
attack surface proactively, reactively, or a combination of each to make study-
ing defences difficult and time sensitive. With MTD, an attacker no longer
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has copious amounts of time to study and familiarise themselves with de-
fences. With the surge of interest in security, especially in MTD, there have
been many MTD techniques proposed in recent years [30] although most
only exist in academia without complete analysis including security and per-
formance evaluation. This includes Flexible Random Virtual internet proto-
col Multiplexing (FRVM) [42], a recent MTD shuffle technique proposed to
proactively mutate protected hosts Internet Protocol (IP) addresses per ser-
vice to invalidate attackers network scanning attempts. Currently, FRVM
is theoretical with analytical security analysis. Before FRVM can be trusted
for deployment, it must be evaluated in terms of performance and security
through realistic evaluation to ensure compatibility with existing network
infrastructure. Without thoroughly evaluated MTD available, the techniques
will not be adopted, and the asymmetric advantage of the attacker will re-
main. Unfortunately, methods for analysis of MTD are still under debate
and most methods use analytical models [3], that do not capture real-world
considerations for deployment.
1.1 Motivation for Study
This thesis will address three challenges present in MTD security: real-world
considerations for deployment, analysis of MTD, and evaluation of FRVM.
With the surge of interest in MTD, many techniques have been proposed
although often these techniques avoid discussion of potential problems with
common network infrastructure and susceptibility to real-world attacker tools.
These problems can be addressed through implementation and deployment
alongside common network infrastructure, and realistic evaluation of secu-
rity and performance. Unfortunately, realistic evaluation has been lacking in
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similar techniques to FRVM. Critique of past MTD techniques in the litera-
ture review will aid in future research. Additionally, past and future MTD
techniques, especially address masking techniques, could make use of the
realistic evaluation described in the methodology. Surprisingly, these con-
siderations are missing in many address masking MTD and collected results
often lack statistical rigour.
FRVM is a promising recent addition to MTD, introduced to improve upon
the existing address masking techniques [49, 41, 23, 22, 21] although it is cur-
rently theoretical with only analytical security analysis. With a virtualised
network, this thesis will realistically evaluate FRVM, measuring its security
and performance. FRVM will benefit in both short and long-term from imple-
mentation, deployment on a network, evaluation through detection of design
issues, practical analysis for support of the analytical results, and additional
future research directions. The evaluation will provide extra insight into the
technique through testing FRVM against network scanning software used by
attackers in real-world attacks [28]. Trust in the technique will also increase
as the results will be reproducible on other systems. Lastly, the evaluation
of FRVM will benefit the field of security through evidence of FRVM’s abil-
ity to defend networks from attackers’ scans and understanding of the per-
formance costs. Increased trust in MTD and FRVM will follow, aiding the
adoption of MTD to real networks. This would abolish the asymmetric ad-
vantage of the attacker against the defender, forcing attackers to design more
complicated MTD aware reconnaissance tools. The research outcomes of the
thesis were meet in the allocated time through assumptions in the research
design: the attacker was not aware of the MTD, attacker had to scan before
launching an attack, and a virtualised network accurately models the delays
of a physical network.
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1.2 Aim and Scope
The aim of this thesis is to realistically evaluate FRVM through deployment
on a virtualised network and evaluate FRVM with respect to security and
performance. The scope will involve a review of literature, implementa-
tion and design of the experiment, and collection and analysis of security
and performance metrics. Literature regarding issues with MTD integra-
tion, network-based MTD techniques, and the assessment of network-based
MTD techniques will be reviewed. The virtualised network will be config-
ured before implementing the controllers. Therefore, the controllers can be
debugged on the network throughout their development. After implemen-
tation of controllers, design of the tests will follow to collect metrics. Upon
collection of the metrics, analysis will be conducted to draw conclusions from
the experiment.
The limitations of this approach include using a virtualised network, as-
sumption of attack chain, and attacker’s unawareness of MTD. Because of
the virtualised network, the exact runtime of the controller or switches fitted
with specialised hardware is unknown. Although the virtualised controller
and switches operate software used in real-world SDN deployments, there-
fore the trends should approximate the true runtime. The security analysis
assumes an attack chain in which reconnaissance and access are the first two
steps although this is not always the case. An example to the contrary is
CryptoLocker [24], that spread through social engineering via email. Lastly,
security analysis with Nmap [28] assumes an attacker that is not MTD aware.
Potentially, modifications to network scanning software could improve at-
tackers’ ability to scan FRVM protected networks.
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1.3 Research Questions
The purpose of this thesis is framed around the following research questions:
• What extra considerations will need to be handled to implement and
deploy FRVM?
• How does FRVM affect security scanning in terms of information dis-
closure and scan duration?
• What is the effect of FRVM on a network’s performance?
1.4 Approach and Outcomes
This thesis involved implementing and deploying FRVM on a virtualised
network for security and performance analysis. FRVM was implemented
with a Network Operating System (NOS), in addition to two comparison
SDN controllers. The comparison controllers implemented Ethernet-level
routing and IP-level routing with address mutation, respectively. Each con-
troller was deployed on the virtualised network and subjugated to security
and performance analysis.
Security was measured with a real-world network scanning tool, Nmap. Dif-
ferent port scanning techniques were tested, with the most threatening tested
with respect to multiple mutation intervals. The level of security was mea-
sured with quantitative metrics for information disclosure and scan duration.
In turn, the metrics were analysed with exploratory statistics.
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Performance testing involved measuring the duration of TCP file transfers
for different levels of network load. This produced quantitative metrics for
the duration at different loads, these were analysed using survival analysis.
This thesis discovered and solved issues with FRVM and existing network
infrastructure. The discovered issues were with Address Resolution Proto-
col (ARP) and default route compatibilities. Additionally, the thesis analysed
security and performance of controllers. The security benefit of address mul-
tiplexing was found to be much greater than its performance cost. Whereas,
the performance cost of address mutation was significant. Although, the ben-
efits of address mutation at a high frequency was found to hugely increase
attackers network scan duration, as well as obfuscating and hiding protected
network information.
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis
The following outlines the structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 describes rele-
vant literature, Chapter 3 the methodology of the thesis, Chapter 4 the results
and analysis, and Chapter 5 the discussion and conclusion. The literature re-
view summarises contributions to the issues with MTD integration, network-
based MTD techniques, and the assessment of network-based MTD tech-
niques. The methodology details the experiment setup including necessary
software and network creation, FRVM coupled with resolved ambiguities
and the software implementation of FRVM and comparison techniques, mea-
surement instruments and data collection, and finally the statistical methods
employed for data analysis. The results analyse collected security metrics
with exploratory statistics and performance metrics with survival statistics,
leading to considering the contributions and implications of the thesis. The
1.5. Organisation of the Thesis 7






The literature review will address three topics in Moving Target Defence
(MTD): integration issues, network-based MTD techniques, and assessment
of network-based MTD techniques. In the past decade, MTD has gained a
lot of interest in security research due to its ability to reduce the defenders’
asymmetric disadvantage against attackers, leading to the proposal of many
MTD techniques. Although many new techniques have been formulated al-
most none have found wide deployment, due to the uncertainty surrounding
MTD performance costs and security benefits [30]. Further, network-based
MTD can invalidate both host and network processes. Before more MTD
techniques can be deployed into real networks their defence must be proven
through both analytical and realistic evaluation. The evaluation should in-
volve interaction with real-world protocols, aiding in finding issues with ex-
isting infrastructure. The following sections introduce concepts related to
issues with MTD integration, past MTD techniques including many that de-
fend against reconnaissance, and assessment performed on past MTD tech-
niques.
10 Chapter 2. Literature Review
2.1 Issues with MTD Integration
Security techniques are designed to protect systems and networks against at-
tackers. This can involve blocking network traffic and applications or deny-
ing permission to resources. While these provide protections, it is important
not to risk the reliability of the protected systems or networks. MTD revolu-
tionises security by removing the asymmetric disadvantage of the defender
against the attacker, although MTD come with extra reliability issues that
must be overcome. MTD introduce these issues through the dynamics that
are applied for protection. Luckily, in the past decade many MTD techniques
have been devised in the excitement of crushing the asymmetric disadvan-
tage; these have been surveyed and design methodologies have been born,
helping new MTD to avoid impairing the reliability of protected systems or
networks.
The dynamics of MTD techniques can cause issues with existing infrastruc-
ture and violate assumptions that are valid for traditional networks, hinder-
ing the legitimate use of protected systems. For network-based MTD these
include mutation on the network topology [18], network addresses [29], and
service port numbers [22, 31]. Due to the randomisation of network proper-
ties [30] implicit assumptions of protocols and common infrastructure can be
violated. An example is the requirement of a web server to be in a known lo-
cation, which could be violated by the randomisation of network addresses.
Further, even if the network properties are not applied to a web server but in-
stead to the client, the dynamics can break the client-server model. It follows
that the issues can be broad although all these issues are not present in ev-
ery network-based MTD technique, neither is the severity the same between
techniques. For this reason, a MTD technique must be thoroughly analysed
to ensure issues with existing infrastructure do not remain undiscovered.
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In the analysis of MTD techniques there is a focus on analytical analysis of
MTD techniques [3]. This is because the creators want a universal tool, that
can readily be applied to any MTD technique. While these tools are useful in
the design process of a technique [14], they tend to ignore specific details in
a MTD technique [51, 55], avoiding a realistic evaluation. Inherently, realistic
evaluation focuses on the technique, losing the ability of universal applica-
tion. Although focusing on the technique allows the evaluation to discover
and solve issues specific to the technique. Therefore, without realistic evalu-
ation of MTD techniques, integration issues with existing infrastructure can
be difficult to discover.
2.2 Network-Based MTD Techniques
Traditional network and system configurations are static, within a large pe-
riod, and therefore usually remain the same after detection by network scan-
ning. Fortunately, dynamics can be applied to a network or system with
MTD to frustrate attackers with extra complexity and time investment. MTD
techniques aim to frustrate the attacker at some stage in the attack chain [30].
FRVM, the focus of this thesis, aims to stop attacker reconnaissance and ac-
cess, the first two links of the attack chain. By protecting links at the be-
ginning of the attack chain, FRVM can stop attacks before they start and
even protect against zero-day attacks. For these reasons, MTD that protect
these links are of particular interest. The following describes and evalu-
ates network-based MTD techniques that defend against one or both of these
links. Evaluation of the analysis conducted on MTD techniques is withheld
until Section 2.3.
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2.2.1 Address Mutation Against Reconnaissance
Address mutation techniques involve, usually proactive, randomisation of
an identifying address, typically an IP address. Coordinating, generating,
and allocating these addresses incurs extra overhead. Two common approaches
regarding host visibility are transparent and non-transparent. Transparent
approaches hide the address randomisation from the protected hosts, avoid-
ing any additional overhead or configuration on the hosts. Whereas, non-
transparent approaches involve the hosts to utilise existing hardware and
share the load.
Transparent Address Mutation Against Reconnaissance
Transparent address mutation techniques tend to achieve their transparency
from hosts by introducing a virtual address space. The resultant network
then has two address spaces: real and virtual. Real addresses are known
by the hosts and the MTD technique. Virtual addresses are known by out-
side users communicating with protected hosts and the MTD technique. The
MTD technique is aware of both, this allows it to map between the addresses
without the knowledge of hosts. The benefit of including the virtual address
space is that upon address mutation, nothing has changed for the protected
hosts since they do not know their virtual addresses.
Over the years, a research group has progressively built upon their address
mutation technique. Beginning with OpenFlow Random Host Mutation (OF-
RHM) [23], the technique sought to mask end hosts IP addresses by introduc-
ing a virtual IP (vIP) address space managed with Software Defined Net-
working (SDN). Each host in an OF-RHM network is allocated a real IP
(rIP) address and vIP address. The vIP address is mutated continually after
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some interval chosen individually for each host based on a decided security
level. Communication with protected hosts is through vIP addresses that are
mapped by a SDN controller to the corresponding rIP address. This allows
OF-RHM to function transparently to end hosts, with only the SDN controller
and switches aware of the vIP address space. Transparency is achieved by
switches on the edge of the network mapping between the vIP and rIP ad-
dress spaces. Chunks of the vIP address space are allocated to each subnet in
an OF-RHM network, in which allocation of vIP addresses to end hosts is per-
formed either with a uniform probability or with some predefined weighting.
To increase the unpredictability of the allocated vIP addresses, the interval in
which no vIP addresses are allocated to the same host twice is maximised for
each subnet using a variation of the knapsack problem.
Moving to Random Host Mutation (RHM), the technique was adjusted to
function on traditional networks without SDN. Additionally, address muta-
tion stages and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) session tracking were
added on top of OF-RHM. The address mutation stages were introduced to
optimise, in terms of time, the allocation of many vIP addresses to hosts. The
stages are Low frequency Mutation (LFM) and High Frequency Mutation
(HFM), and many HFMs occur in a single LFM. LFM allocates a range of vir-
tual IP addresses (VAR) to each host, ensuring to minimise the size of unused
address space. For each host, HFM randomly selects a single vIP address
from the set of VAR, allocated by the LFM stage. Thus, LFM must ensure
each host has a VAR which relates to the hosts’ specific mutation rate. The
LFM and HFM were added to speed up mutation rate and hence improve
unpredictability. RHM performs TCP session tracking to ensure connectivity
between end hosts is not lost between address mutations. Thus, upon a HFM
on a host, any new incoming sessions receive the new vIP address although
all old sessions will communicate with their original vIP address. Therefore,
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a host may be associated with multiple vIP addresses at any one time.
Finally, retaining the name RHM [22, 21] the technique employs short-lived
ephemeral IP (eIP) addresses that are like the vIP addresses that were in-
troduced in both OF-RHM [41] and RHM [41]. Although RHM now ran-
domises Media Access Control (MAC) addresses and domain names and fur-
ther builds upon the address allocation by detecting scanning to modify the
allocation of eIP addresses. Thus, the eIP addresses are not randomly se-
lected uniformly, like other address randomisation techniques, providing an
adversary-aware proactive defence. This further ensures that a naive attacker
cannot scan the eIP address space.
Downsides of these techniques include tracking connections, retention of vIP
addresses, static access information, higher demand of IP addresses, and pos-
sible address collisions. The techniques track TCP connections to ensure ad-
dresses associated with concurrent connections are retained. Due to the vast
number of connections a server can have this can become expensive. Addi-
tionally, the retained vIP addresses can lead to exhaustion of the IP address
space. This would be easily exploitable by an attacker using a Slowloris at-
tack [52]. Despite the movement of addresses, any data collected in the access
stage can be stored and used to increase the speed of scanning. For example,
port information could be used for rediscovery or fingerprinting of a spe-
cific host. With the addition of the LFM and HFM mutation stages, more
unused addresses are needed to avoid address collisions. Unfortunately, IP
addresses are a constrained resource. Further, the address pool, VAR, is gen-
erated from addresses that are not in ongoing connections. It follows that a
smaller scale Slowloris attack could significantly increase the chance of ad-
dress collisions. With the generation of VARs, further address collisions are
possible. The vIP addresses in VARs are generated with hash functions, the
resultant hash is feed through modulo arithmetic to ensure the IP address fits
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in the specified subnetwork. Typically, hash functions have high collision re-
sistance although modulo arithmetic will reduce the variability of the hashes.
This will increase the chance of an address collision within a VAR.
Non-Transparent Address Mutation Against Reconnaissance
Non-transparent address mutation techniques include protected hosts in the
technique, distributing the workload. Although, including hosts requires
modification of their systems.
Since the introduction of MTD, there have been many techniques that at-
tempt to limit attackers’ ability to perform network reconnaissance. Although
this paper [29] suggested that past techniques either have scalability issues
or cannot communicate with unmodified clients. SDN shuffle was proposed
to improve upon past address masking techniques by shifting load onto the
protected network hosts and compatibility with TCP. The load is shifted by
the SDN controller intercepting DNS replies and instructing hosts of the Net-
work Address Translation (NAT) rules that should be applied to the packets.
This avoids the SDN controller and switches sustaining all the extra over-
head. Although, without transparency from the hosts, they become more
complex, requiring additional software. Compatibility with TCP is achieved
by allocating a new address per connection. Although this implementation
is simple, it could lead to address exhaustion quickly. Additionally, for the
SDN controller to generate IP addresses for each connection the TCP sessions
need to be tracked. This could lead to a large overhead with many connec-
tions. Lastly, the NAT rules are installed on the client and server although
hosts tend to lack any specialised networking hardware.
Network Address Space Randomisation (NASR) [1] was an early attempt at
limiting the spread of hitlist worms with address mutation. Hitlist worms
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pose a greater risk than usual self-propagating worms due to their increased
speed. Assembling a list of vulnerable machines in advance of the attack,
hitlist worms can avoid host discovery during their spread. NASR aims to
combat their ability by mutating addresses over a long interval, slowly ex-
piring the attacker stored information. Intervals of newer address mutation
techniques change within minutes whereas NASR changed within hours.
Formally, NASR is a proactive MTD that mutates addresses with the use of
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP). Protected hosts are reminded
to mutate by NASR, although if the host is in an ongoing connection NASR
will not send the reminder until a limit of deferrals has been reached. This
approach would likely incur a lower performance penalty than newer ad-
dress mutation technique due to the slower address mutation. Although,
this approach still tracks ongoing TCP connections. Disadvantages include
the security and performance trade-off and slow mutation rate.
2.2.2 MT6D Based techniques
As more network infrastructure transitions over to Internet Protocol version
6 (IPv6), some address masking techniques have adopted IPv6. Due to the
formation of IPv6, privacy-related crimes are easier for an attacker due to ex-
tra address assignment mechanisms that were not available in IP version 4.
The Moving Target IPv6 Defence (MT6D) [9, 10, 38] aimed to solve privacy
concerns introduced in IPv6 in addition to disrupting eavesdropping, replay
attacks, and other attacks that assume a static address. As a proof of concept,
privacy concerns were demonstrated by setting up a Wireless Sensor Net-
work (WSN) over Virginia Tech’s campus to track android mobile phone that
travelled between networks on campus. MT6D mutates network addresses
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with high frequency, however, a modified network address will disrupt ex-
isting connections. Thus, MT6D tunnels packets inside of a User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) packet, and both communicating clients must run MT6D to
encapsulate and decapsulate outgoing and incoming packets, respectively.
During the process of encapsulation, the source and destination addresses
are stripped from the packet and the encapsulating UDP packet has source
and destination set to the current random addresses. Upon arrival, the data is
decapsulated and the original source and destination addresses are replaced.
To achieve this, hosts must share a common secret before communication to
generate the random addresses. MT6D can be run both transparently and
non-transparently. Transparency can be achieved by running the encapsula-
tion and decapsulation on a gateway, or it could run non-transparently on
the host machine. MT6D has been proposed as a protection for the smart
grid [15], given that it is running transparently. Weaknesses of MT6D include
that either a complex gateway or increased complexity of hosts is required, all
communicating parties must have a MT6D setup, tight time synchronisation
is needed to ensure mutated addresses are consistent between communicat-
ing parties, and there are no address allocation considerations in the network
thus there may be collisions.
With the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) over the past years [6] many dif-
ferent products have been released that collect personal data with the aim of
personalising users’ experience. Collected personal data must be protected
introducing challenges with past methods due to mobile and resource con-
straints inherit in IoT devices. µMT6D [54, 53] is an adaptation of MT6D [9,
38] to function on IoT devices. To achieve deployment on IoT, optimisations
had to be made including converting source code from Python [36] to C,
designing a more efficient dynamic address change, and using lightweight
hash algorithms. Currently, the last two points have not been implemented
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into µMT6D although the current implementation has been deployed onto
two different testbeds: simulation software and a small number of WSN
nodes. Weaknesses of µMT6D include those already existing in MT6D in
addition to the requirement of a µMT6D gateway for limited IoT and the cur-
rent progress of the project. Additionally, most IoT are limited and many are
mobile thus the requirement for a µMT6D gateway for Internet connectivity
could be frustrating unless deployment was vast.
Users wishing to make their connection secure and private usually opt for a
Virtual Private Network (VPN). Although the security and privacy of VPN
users rely heavily on the entry and exit points remaining undiscovered. The
Moving Target Mobile IPv6 Defence (MTM6D) [17] was designed to apply
MT6D concepts [9] to a VPN and additionally improve upon shortcomings
of MT6D. The improvements include the possibility of address collisions and
the need for time synchronisation between gateways. In a follow-up pa-
per, the application of MTM6D to VPN servers was suggested as an anti-
censorship platform [16]. The main difference between MTM6D and MT6D
is the use of mobile IPv6 addresses and the associated mechanisms built into
IPv6 to generate IP addresses. This generates a single static Home Address
(HoA) and many temporary Care-of-Addresses (CoAs) that act as the vIP ad-
dresses. A CoA is generated for every host connecting to the VPN, and due
to the enormous address space of IPv6 and the number of connections a VPN
server can handle this should be achievable. Although a network scan has
the possibility of finding the HoA, thus bypassing the anonymity afforded
by the CoAs.
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2.2.3 Address Mutation Against Reconnaissance and Access
There have been many IP address related MTD techniques released although
privacy issues still exist. Flexible Random Virtual IP Multiplexing (FRVM) [42]
was proposed as an alternative to past IP address mutation techniques with
the addition of service multiplexing per host to protect against access. Sim-
ilar to OF-RHM [23] and RHM [41, 22, 21], vIP addresses are mapped from
hosts rIP addresses to vIP addresses by switches at network edge. The vIP
address space is mutated on a constant interval although at this point there
is no method of optimising the distribution of vIP, as in RHM [41]. FRVM is
deployed on a controller in a SDN-based network to install necessary flows
on switches for address mutation. The novel addition that FRVM introduces
beyond past address masking techniques is that rather than allocating vIP
addresses per host, FRVM allocates vIP addresses per service. Therefore,
a single host can have multiple vIP addresses, further improving defence
against reconnaissance and access and lowering the asymmetric advantage
of the attacker. Disadvantages include incompatibility with the TCP proto-
col and simple address allocation. The incompatibility comes from the vIP
addresses mutating, this violates TCP’s assumption that IP addresses will re-
main the same over the duration of connections. The address allocation is
simple and has not been improved to increase efficiency.
2.2.4 Obfuscation of Network Information
Obfuscation of network information involves invalidating information in pack-
ets that could be useful to attackers. Usually, this is achieved with the help of
an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to detect potential attackers. Detection
allows the obfuscation to only be applied to malicious packets. However,
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detection is never perfect and false positives are always going to occur. The
following techniques obfuscate network information to confuse attackers.
The aim of CHAOS [43] is to invalidate network reconnaissance and access
information gained by the attacker through obfuscation of network configu-
rations. CHAOS aims to achieve this through detection and obfuscation of
unexpected traffic in terms of IP address, port numbers, and system finger-
print. In addition, CHAOS aimed to streamline this process to enable deploy-
ment on real networks. To aid in this, a data structure called a CHAOS Tower
Structure (CTS) was developed to optimise the detection of unexpected traf-
fic. The CTS is essentially a threat pyramid in which hosts are placed in
descending level of risk, evaluated based on ease of exploitation and impact
if exploited. Connections are flagged if initiated from a higher layer to a
lower layer and are then judged by an IDS, unless the connection is marked
as special. Special connections are those connections that are expected be-
tween the two hosts, regardless of the hosts’ placement in the CTS. These are
usually connections which are important to the functionality of the network.
Weaknesses of CHAOS include attacks spreading to lower layers and static
detection of traffic. If an attack has occurred on a higher layer of the CTS then
CHAOS makes no effort to stop the spread to lower layers. CHAOS does not
obfuscate all connections and thus relies on detection by an IDS, although
an IDS is only as accurate as the signatures it is configured to detect. It fol-
lows that an attacker using an unknown scanning technique or stealthy scan
would not have their results obfuscated as there will not be any signatures
able to match the scanning technique.
Traditional protection mechanisms that protect against scanning block or
drop suspected packets, thus the attacker is aware that data is missing. Rather
than alerting the attacker, Sniffer Reflector [49] obfuscates the responses to
suspected packets, warping attackers’ view of the network. Sniffer Reflector
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utilises a scan sensor and shadow network to defend a protected network.
The scan sensor scans all traffic and detects packets suspected of scanning.
All the detected scanning packets are forwarded to the shadow network. The
shadow network is a virtualised copy of the protected network although with
port numbers and offered services modified. In this way, the shadow net-
work can fool an attacker into believing that the received data is correct. The
protected network is not aware of the scan sensor or shadow network and re-
ceives all packets that are not suspected by the scan sensor. The weaknesses
of Sniffer Reflector are the scan sensor and randomisation of the network.
The protection of the system relies on the scan sensor; thus, scans must be
detected to be obfuscated. The shadow network remains similar to the real
network but randomises port numbers and services, thus if a server does not
display some essential services it can be easily discovered to be a fake.
2.3 Assessment of Network-Based MTD Techniques
The assessment of security techniques should be thorough including an as-
sessment of both security and performance. Especially in the case of MTD
techniques due to their relative youth in comparison to traditional security.
Additionally, MTD adds extra complexities through dynamics. Ideally, the
assessment of MTD involves realistic evaluation, bringing the benefit of dis-
covering issues with existing infrastructure through implementation and de-
ployment. The following describes the analysis of past MTD techniques
along with the advantages and disadvantages of their approaches.
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2.3.1 Topology Mutation Against Launch
Hong et al. [18] devised a shuffle-based MTD technique that randomly modi-
fied the topology of a network using SDN. The aim was to use a shuffle-based
method to increase the diversity of a network by constructing diverse attack
paths. The next network configuration is chosen from a set of possible con-
figurations to maximise the number of variant Operating System (OS) nodes
along all paths. Through simulations on a SDN testbed, the performance
was evaluated, and the techniques security was analysed analytically. The
overhead was measured in terms of packet loss rate and delay on delivered
packets for different mutation intervals and topological changes. The lowest
packet loss rate reported was less than 5% for a mutation interval of 1 sec-
ond. Although in terms of the number of packets that are routed through a
network this is massive. Reporting an acceptable packet loss rate, along with
its corresponding mutation interval, would have increased confidence in the
feasibility of the technique. Additionally, the security of the technique was
not tested to ensure it matched the analytical model. In summary, the met-
rics used to study the performance overhead were chosen well but were not
compared to typical packet loss rates.
2.3.2 Address Mutation
Address mutation techniques protect hosts by changing their identities proac-
tively or reactively. Further, transparent approaches map between virtual
and real address spaces. With these modifications, infrastructure incompat-
ibilities can be introduced. For this reason, realistic evaluation is especially
important. The following describes the analysis performed on past address
mutation techniques.
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Analysis of Limits to Address Shuffling
Many address shuffling techniques have been devised that employ address
mutation [23, 29, 9] although there has not been a focus on the theoretical
limits of address shuffling. Carroll et al. [4] does not propose a new MTD
model but analyses the theoretical limits of address shuffling with a mathe-
matical urn model. With the use of the urn model, this paper analyses how
many probes an attacker needs before discovering a valid address. This con-
dition would occur for an attacker or worm probing for a single open port
for which they have an exploit. Two specific cases are modelled: static ad-
dresses and perfect address shuffling. In a traditional network, the addresses
are static and therefore do not change over time. Perfect address shuffling
simulates a reactive MTD technique where the address space is reshuffled
after each of the attackers address probes. The test conditions in this paper
are too broad such as assuming perfect shuffling and success of an attacker.
Perfect address shuffling is a poor assumption since it is unattainable as the
resultant overhead on the system would cause high latency and packet loss.
Attacker success occurred if a single valid address was discovered although
this did not consider the time for launching an attack.
Transparent Address Mutation Against Reconnaissance
The MTD techniques OF-RHM [23] and RHM [41, 22, 21] are incremental
works on devising an address mutation technique that can defend against
reconnaissance whilst meeting performance constraints. Over these works
the analysis has grown although most are analytical or obtained through
simulations, these techniques tend to miss real-world issues. The analysis
contained includes performance overheads, network scans, and simulation
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of scans. The measured performance overheads included analytical analy-
sis of routing, mutation, DNS updates, and packet delay. The network scans
were conducted with Nmap scans using host discovery, this did not involve
testing various types of scans or testing the discovery of ports. The simula-
tion of scans involved testing the techniques effectiveness against scanning
worms, including the effect of worm propagation on scanning effectiveness.
In summary, there is a lot of analysis here although most of it is analytical
or simulation-based. These approaches are susceptible to missing real-world
considerations including compatibility with common network infrastructure
and software.
Non-Transparent Address Mutation Against Reconnaissance
The SDN shuffle [29] is a MTD technique designed to generate random syn-
thetic IP and MAC addresses to defend against network reconnaissance. The
synthetic IP and MAC are managed directly by the hosts rather than by a
SDN controller and switches. The SDN shuffle was evaluated on perfor-
mance and security. The performance was measured on virtualised machines
using a software implementation of SDN Shuffle, specifically the latency in-
troduced by the SDN controller handling Domain Name Service (DNS) re-
quests and modification of NAT rules were measured. Processes such as
address translation via the NAT device was not measured as the overhead
has already been deemed acceptable due to its wide adoption. However,
the address translation is usually applied by a NAT device rather than host
systems, breaking this assumption. Additionally, some processes that lacked
wide adoption such as generation or management of synthetic addresses was
not analysed. Security was analysed analytically in terms of unpredictability,
the vastness of the movement space, regularity of movement, and availability
of protected services. Unfortunately, security was not realistically evaluated,
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in a similar way to the performance, but rather a brief analytical review. In
summary, the weaknesses of the analysis of SDN shuffle included ignoring
possible performance delays and a lack of security testing on the implemen-
tation of SDN shuffle.
NASR [1] was an early address mutation technique that mutated addresses
at a low rate using the DHCP. NASR tracks the TCP connections of protected
hosts and coordinates address changes. With this and the abortion chance
of TCP connections upon address changes, NASR had to be analysed. The
analysis consisted of experimental and simulation approaches. Experimen-
tal analysis included host discovery over the Internet and disruption of TCP
connections upon different address mutation intervals. The host discovery
was conducted with application-level probing, random scanning over class
B addresses, and search engine reconnaissance. The speed of randomisation
was analysed to find how NASR would slow the spread of hitlist worms. The
disruption of TCP connections was simulated with different address chang-
ing frequencies. The analysis considered many real-world considerations,
for example, the experimental analysis was completed over the Internet and
with massive Autonomous Systems (ASs). Unfortunately, the security anal-
ysis completed on NASR’s mechanisms was simulated and delays related to
switching addresses was not considered.
Address Mutation Against Reconnaissance and Access
In addition to address randomisation using vIP addresses, FRVM [42] multi-
plexes the addresses of hosts using service port numbers. This allows hosts
to have multiple vIP addresses. The analysis consists of analytical security
testing using a probability model to measure attacker success. An attack is
assumed to be successful upon the discovery of a single host through its IP
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address and modelled with a binomial model. Weaknesses in this analy-
sis include lack of performance analysis, model assumptions, and missing
multiplexing. The probability model is binomial which assumes each trial
is independent, this is not true for scanning an address space unless ad-
dress shuffling is performed after every probe. Otherwise the trials are not
independent. Lastly, this analysis does not demonstrate the advantages of
address multiplexing. In fact, discovering a single valid IP address will be
easier with address multiplexing since there are more valid addresses. Anal-
ysis of port discovery should be shown to demonstrate the benefit of address
multiplexing.
2.3.3 MT6D Based Techniques
MT6D [9, 15] mutates IPv6 addresses with a high frequency in comparison
to other address mutation techniques. The testing involved both connection-
less and connection-orientated traffic via Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMP) and TCP, respectively. For both traffic types, the packet loss and
latency at each point in the system was recorded. This allowed the over-
head of the system to be analysed, in addition to the specific components
that caused bottlenecking. There appeared to be a lack of statistical evidence
despite the comprehensiveness of the performance testing conducted such as
missing confidence intervals for the collected metrics and no transparency in
the number of samples collected for the system latency. Security testing con-
sisted of analytical analysis of the address entropy. In summary, the scope
of performance testing was impressive including measuring delays at multi-
ple points in the system although necessary statistical analysis was not con-
ducted. Additionally, security testing was lacking a thorough analysis of the
level of security provided by MT6D.
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The MTM6D [17, 16], designed with the concepts of MT6D [9] in mind, ap-
plies address mutation to VPN servers as an anti-censorship technique. The
technique’s performance was analysed analytically and experimentally with
respect to packet overhead and packet loss, respectively. The packet over-
head strictly recorded the additional packet headers and their sizes in bytes,
that were needed for the technique. Packet loss between movement of ad-
dresses was measured in a testbed, this was compared without MTD and
at different addresses movement intervals. Unfortunately, some analysis
was missing including the performance impact to ongoing connections and
analysing the security benefit. The extra performance cost to ongoing con-
nections in terms of latency or speed was not recorded. The security benefit
with regards to tracking attacks was not analysed. Despite deployment of
MTM6D on a physical network, there has not been a large amount of formal
analysis, rather the deployment was in the aim of testing optimisations in a
realistic setting.
2.3.4 Obfuscation of Network Information
Chaos [43] is a MTD technique designed to detect threat levels and obfuscate
unexpected traffic accordingly in terms of IP address, port numbers, and sys-
tem fingerprints. Chaos was evaluated in terms of performance and security
and compared against an unprotected system and MTD protected system
with static obfuscation. Security of the three networks was evaluated using
Nmap [28]. The techniques were compared with respect to the level of in-
formation disclosure. This revealed how effective Chaos was at detecting the
threat level and applying the appropriate level of obfuscation. Unfortunately,
the variability of the collected data was not demonstrated. Performance of
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the technique was verified by measuring the average packet delay in the net-
work, although the exact paths were unspecified. In summary, comparisons
were made between networks but statistical tests to prove the integrity of the
data were not performed.
Sniffer Reflector [49] attempts to obfuscate reconnaissance and access by de-
tecting and responding with incorrect information to network scans. The
proposed system includes a scan sensor, shadow network, and a protected
network. A software implementation of Sniffer Reflector was deployed in a
visualised environment to access its security and performance. Security was
accessed by performing network scans via Nmap [28] and comparing the
collected information against a network without Sniffer Reflector deployed.
Success was measured by the level of obfuscation of the scanned network
details. Performance testing was lacking except for latency introduced at the
attacker end whilst scanning. Although the performance effect on users was
not analysed. Security testing was performed and included comparisons to
typical systems but without statistical integrity. There appeared to be a sam-
ple size of one for the Nmap scans and statistical rigour between the different
scanned systems was missing leading to a lack of confidence in the collected
results. In summary, the performance and security testing conducted had
some significant issues. Although testing with a typical system to compare
results was well founded, as it provided a baseline for the results.
2.4 Summary
Design of MTD techniques has matured and general guidelines for this pro-
cess are available. The current material introduces models along with eval-
uations of past MTD techniques to allow future designers to improve on the
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past. Unfortunately, the focus of MTD evaluation tended towards model-
based approaches with little attention towards realistic evaluation. Further, if
analysis contained realistic evaluation, usually it ignored either performance
or security. Realistic evaluation has the benefit of testing a MTD technique
alongside existing infrastructure. Specifically of interest to this thesis are
network-based MTD techniques that protect a host by obscuring their iden-
tity. FRVM, the focus of this thesis, belongs to this group. Most address muta-
tion techniques can operate transparently to the protected hosts although the
method to obtain transparency differs. The techniques used include a dedi-
cated gateway that intercepts traffic and encapsulates the packets and a SDN
setup that maps between address spaces. Some MTD attempt to make perfor-
mance savings by applying dynamics only to those hosts that are suspected
of being an attacker. Unfortunately, detection will always have false nega-
tives, thus unknown or stealthy scanning techniques can operate undetected
on these networks. These issues and the need for security and performance
comparisons between competing MTD techniques give rise to the need for
thorough security and performance testing. Many MTD techniques, despite
describing a software implementation, did not perform realistic evaluation
with respect to either security or performance. The evaluation of results for
MTD techniques reviewed usually lacked important steps such as including





Flexible Random Virtual internet protocol Multiplexing (FRVM) is a recent
Moving Target Defence (MTD) technique that defends against attacker net-
work reconnaissance and access. The defence involves mutating multiple
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses per protected hosts on an interval. FRVM
has been analytically analysed in terms of security [42]. Although, FRVM is
lacking realistic evaluation to verify the analytical analysis and identify am-
biguities and issues through the design, implementation, and deployment
process. These problems lead to the following research questions.
• What extra considerations will need to be handled to implement and
deploy FRVM?
• How does FRVM affect security scanning in terms of information dis-
closure and scan duration?
• What is the effect of FRVM on a network’s performance?
In the conquest of answering these questions, a methodology was formed.
This chapter outlines the components of realistically evaluating FRVM: threat
model, FRVM theory along with its benefits and issues, metrics of analy-
sis, configuring the virtualised network, implementation of SDN controllers,
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measurement instruments, data collection, and data analysis. The threat
model describes the assumptions and methods that the modelled attacker
would use in their attempt to bypass security. The security and performance
of FRVM was evaluated with network scanning and file transfer duration
over the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), respectively. Further, typical
Software Defined Network (tSDN) and Random Simplex vIP Mapper (RSM)
controllers were evaluated alongside FRVM for comparison. Measurements
of the SDN controllers were taken on a virtualised network. Security was
measured with Nmap and judged by the level of information disclosure and
scan duration. Performance was measured with TCP file transfers at varying
levels of network load, judged by the duration of the transfer. The quantita-
tive data collected from security and performance testing was analysed with
inferential and descriptive statistics.
3.1 Threat Model
Before the security of FRVM could be evaluated, knowledge of the methods
an attacker could employ to bypass FRVM had to be known. The implicit
assumption is that an attacker needs to complete these before exploiting a
system, the assumed attack chain follows [30].
Reconnaissance→ Access→ Development→ Launch→ Persistence (3.1)
Firstly, the attacker must perform reconnaissance to locate the host via an IP
address. Access follows from reconnaissance involving the discovery of de-
tailed information about the target, like the open ports on which vulnerable
services operate. Development utilises the detailed information found in the
access stage to craft an attack. The attack is then realised in the launch phase.
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Persistence involves adjusting the exploited system to retain hold. Clearly,
the completion of any link assumes the successful completion of all previ-
ous links. FRVM protects against reconnaissance and access through address
mutation and multiplexing, stopping attackers before they gain a foothold.
3.2 Overview of FRVM
FRVM [42] is a shuffle-based MTD technique that mutates and obscures the
attack surface of a network. It achieves this by periodically changing the IP
addresses of protected hosts and allocating IP addresses per service. With
SDN, FRVM can intercept network traffic and modify network switches flow
tables to dynamically change the behaviour of a network. FRVM’s address
mutation and multiplexing protects hosts from attackers. Hosts and their ser-
vices are identified with IP addresses and port numbers, respectively. Rather
than mutating the IP addresses of hosts directly, FRVM introduces virtual IP
addresses that allow IP address mutations to act transparently from the pro-
tected hosts. Every protected host retains their real IP (rIP) address known
by themselves but in addition, hosts have virtual IP (vIP) addresses known
and managed by the FRVM controller. Protected hosts are identified using
their vIP addresses rather than their rIP address. Switches connected to the
controller change between rIP addresses and vIP addresses whilst routing,
allowing address changes to be transparent to the protected hosts. The trans-
parency avoids extra overhead on the protected hosts as the FRVM controller
and switches manage the vIP addresses and the mapping between them. Pe-
riodic address mutation in the virtual address space provides additional pro-
tection to hosts as their identity changes making it difficult for attackers to
track the hosts.
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FIGURE 3.1: Illustrates communication between two FRVM
protected hosts in the same subnet, h1 and h2, that are mapped
and forwarded by two intermediate switches, s1 and s2.
During reconnaissance and access, an attacker attempts to learn the IP ad-
dress of a host and find the open ports that operate exploitable services. The
mutation of IP addresses defends against attacker reconnaissance by increas-
ing the difficulty of locating hosts and storage of discovered host informa-
tion. The multiplexing of IP addresses minimises the damage of IP discovery
by addressing every service with its own IP address. Further, the danger of
system fingerprinting is abolished as each IP address exposes only a partial
view of the host. Since network reconnaissance and access are often the first
two steps of an attack [46], FRVM can protect against unknown vulnerabili-
ties.
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3.2.1 Address Mapping
FRVM protects hosts from network reconnaissance by periodically changing
vIP addresses, thus stopping attackers from gaining a foothold in the system.
Similar to earlier techniques [23, 41, 22, 21], FRVM maps rIP addresses to vIP
addresses at the network edge by mapping IP addresses at the closest switch
to a protected host, demonstrated in Figure 3.1. An edge switch is the clos-
est intermediate switch on the hosts network path, in the Figure 3.1 s1 and
s2 are the edges switches for h1 and h2, respectively. Earlier techniques have
applied vIP addresses to avoid attacker reconnaissance although FRVM ad-
ditionally protects against access through addressing each service offered by
a protected host with a unique vIP address and port number pair, referred
to as vIP address multiplexing. FRVM protected hosts have a single rIP ad-
dress but can have many vIP addresses. Additionally, a vIP address may
be associated with multiple hosts through different port numbers. Address
multiplexing further obfuscates the identity of hosts changing the view of a
network and the services offered. Formally, FRVM has m-to-1 multiplexing
and 1-to-m de-multiplexing between a real address space and virtual address
space, respectively, where m is the number of services on each host. The do-
main and co-domain of the multiplexing and demultiplexing functions can
be expressed as
fmultiplexing : VIP× P→ RIP× P (3.2)
and demultiplexing
fdemultiplexing : RIP× P→ VIP× P (3.3)
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using the sets
RIP = {rIP1, rIP2, ..., rIPR} (3.4)
and
VIP = {vIP1, vIP2, ..., vIPV} (3.5)
and
P = {p1, p2, ..., pP} (3.6)
where RIP, VIP, and P are the sets of rIP addresses, vIP addresses, and port
numbers, respectively. It follows that the multiplexing and demultiplexing
functions can be expressed as
fmultiplexing(vIPi, pi) = (rIPj, pi) (3.7)
fdemultiplexing(rIPj, pi) = (vIPi, pi) (3.8)
where fmultiplexing is the inverse of fdemultiplexing. Note that the port numbers
associated with a rIP and vIP mapping remain static.
3.2.2 Benefits of FRVM
FRVM is not the first MTD technique to introduce address mutation, or even
achieve transparency using vIP addresses. FRVM introduces address multi-
plexing that provides benefits on top of past techniques including increased
defence against host discovery methods, less static information between move-
ments, and increased search space.
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FIGURE 3.2: Illustrates the difference made by address multi-
plexing with respect to information disclosed by a port probe.
The comparison is between RSM and FRVM deployed net-
works. User A probes a host in RSM and FRVM networks.
Defence Against Host Discovery
Host discovery is the first step of a network scan, in which probes are sent to
potential hosts to check their availability. Typically, this reduces the amount
of work in the next step, port discovery, by decreasing the number of hosts.
Common probes include Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), Address
Resolution Protocol (ARP), User Datagram Protocol (UDP), and TCP; the
transport layer probes are sent to commonly open ports. In an unprotected
network, a host will answer to any of these probes. Although, FRVM reduces
the information disclosed by changing the network view of hosts through ad-
dress multiplexing. With address multiplexing, if a host responds to a probe
only the virtual address associated with the probe’s port is exposed to the
attacker. The differences are summarised in Figure 3.2, this shows that after
probing FRVM, the host only knows the vIP address that communicates with
the probed port. However, probing a controller that employs address muta-
tion, without address multiplexing, still results in an address that could be
38 Chapter 3. Method
used for communication with any port on the host.
Although not immediately clear, address multiplexing protects FRVM from
outside attackers attempting host discovery, increasing the search space of
the scan. Between networks, attackers can probe with ICMP or common
ports through UDP and TCP. Firstly, IP multiplexing requires the use of a
port number in addition to the IP address. Although ICMP is a portless
protocol as it operates below the transport layer. Therefore, ICMP packets
will not be mapped to a virtual IP address. Secondly, using common port
numbers doesn’t allow attackers to discover hosts as FRVM addresses each
service rather than each host.
Reduced Static Information of FRVM
Attackers cannot identify hosts between different scans due to FRVM’s pro-
tection. Without address multiplexing, after scanning a host the set of open
ports discovered through a single IP address can be used to fingerprint a
host, even with address mutation protections. Address multiplexing stops
fingerprinting by addressing each service of a host, rather than each host.
Therefore after scanning, the set of discovered open ports are each associated
with different IP addresses, with no way to correlate them to a single host.
Increased Search Space of FRVM
The search space for a network scan on FRVM is largely increased due to
its defence against host discovery through multiplexing over ports. Without
host discovery, all port probes must be sent to every address in the subnet
range. Usually there are many more port probes than host probes, therefore
this dramatically increases the duration of a scan.
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3.2.3 Issues with Existing Network Infrastructure
The specification of FRVM contains ambiguities that cause problems during
integration alongside existing network infrastructure. These include TCP in-
compatibility, router address randomisation, and multiplexing over portless
protocols. These problems are discussed below and their resolutions for the
FRVM software implementation in Section 3.6.
TCP Connections
Currently, FRVM is incompatible with TCP due to address mutations. TCP
connections make the implicit assumption that the communicating hosts IP
addresses will remain static during the connection, an assumption that the
mutation of IP addresses violates. It follows that if an FRVM address mu-
tation occurs during an ongoing connection, the communicating hosts are
disconnected.
Default Gateways
Hosts typically rely on a default gateway to route packets towards destina-
tions outside of the hosts’ network. This greatly simplifies the task of routing
for the host, allowing the host to define a single static IP address route for all
outside hosts. With FRVM’s address mutation, a routers IP address would
not be static. It follows that if a router is allocated a vIP address, the hosts
cannot make use of default gateways.
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Portless Protocols
FRVM multiplexes vIP address and port number pairs into corresponding
rIP address and port number pairs, as described in Subsection 3.2.1. How-
ever, this makes the implicit assumption that every packet has a port num-
ber associated with it although this is not the case. Example protocols that
operate without the transport layer include ARP and ICMP. ARP is a request-
response protocol used to discover a host’s corresponding Media Access Con-
trol (MAC) address given the IP address is known, a function that is critical
for communication. The request is often broadcast over the network and
the host with the matching IP address responds with their MAC address.
Although without a port number, FRVM cannot multiplex over the IP ad-
dresses.
3.3 Metrics of Evaluation
The evaluation of FRVM was split into two parts: security and performance.
Demonstrating the effect of a SDN controller on either requires metrics that
reliably and accurately describe the effect. The metrics selected for security
and performance testing are described separately in the following subsec-
tions.
3.3.1 Metrics of Security Testing
The security of the tSDN, RSM, and FRVM controllers was demonstrated
through network scans with Nmap [28] involving host and port discovery.
Similar techniques [49, 22, 1] have utilised network scanning to model se-
curity. Network scans provided metrics for the number of hosts discovered,
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number of ports discovered on each machine, and duration of the scan. The
former two were collected as information disclosure metrics.
The primary aim of attackers scanning is to obtain information about the
target network that can be used to develop and launch an exploit. A vari-
ety of information is collected that describes the hosts including availability,
ports along with statuses, and the Operating System (OS). The host discov-
ery phase determines the availability. The port discovery phase determines
the open, filtered, and closed ports and the OS of the host if fingerprinting
was successful. Neither the filtered or closed ports, nor the OS fingerprint,
were used to judge the level of information disclosure. Ports that are marked
as filtered or closed are not exploitable, unlike open ports. The OS of the host
was not included as detecting this incurs extra duration. Due to the address
mutations of the MTD controllers, the duration of scans could significantly
affect the success of network scans. Scans both with and without fingerprint-
ing were not taken due to time constraints of the thesis. It follows that the
amount of information disclosure was measured with respect to discovered
hosts and ports, to represent the success of an attacker in reconnaissance and
access, the links protected by FRVM.
FRVM mutates IP addresses on an interval, hiding addresses from attacker
and expiring any collected information. It follows that the duration of a scan
can affect the amount of collected data that is still valid after completion, due
to address mutations. Further, address mutation and multiplexing add addi-
tional difficulties to scanning. These difficulties include large packet timeouts
waiting on a host’s response that is no longer associated with the probed IP
address. These difficulties can be measured by duration of the scan.
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3.3.2 Metrics of Performance Testing
The duration of file transfers over TCP, for differing levels of network load,
demonstrated the performance of the tSDN, RSM, and FRVM controllers.
The load was varied separately by either increasing the number of concur-
rently transferring servers or connections to a server.
The goal was to find a metric that described the additional delay experienced
by the network due to the deployment of the SDN controllers. This could ei-
ther be measured by finding the extra delay experienced by packets through
the network, or the delay incurred by extra actions performed by the con-
trollers. The former was chosen over the latter because of the difficulty in
measuring small delays on the virtualised network as differences could be
obscured by measurement error. Specifically, the duration of file transfer
over TCP measured the accumulated additional delay over the packets in
the connection. Additionally, this allowed the load to be varied with more
connections. Delays have been measured with connection orientated traffic
by a past address mutation technique [10], although without the addition of
varying levels of load.
3.4 System Software
All the development software used in the evaluation of FRVM is freely avail-
able, with a large portion open source, improving the replicability of the ex-
periment. The development environment operated Ubuntu 17.10 64-bit [27]
virtualised with Oracle VM VirtualBox [33], as a subset of the development
software required a Linux distribution. All program logic was implemented
with Python [36], due to its readability and far reach. Python 2.7, rather than
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Python 3.x, was required by a subset of the development libraries. Python
has far reach because it is taught to many modern developers as their first
programming language and ranks among the top programming languages in
popularity and usage [13, 8]. The software implementations of tSDN, RSM,
and FRVM operated on Software Defined Networking (SDN) controllers that
were deployed onto a virtualised network. Essential software for the virtu-
alisation of FRVM included Ryu [37] and Mininet [26]. Ryu is a Network
Operating System (NOS), written in Python, that provides Python libraries
for OpenFlow communication. Mininet can create virtualised networks con-
taining nodes such as hosts, OpenFlow switches, and SDN controllers us-
ing network namespaces and virtual Ethernet pairs [26]. Additionally, Wire-
shark [12] was used to sniff packets on the virtualised network to aid in con-
troller debugging and discovery of large delays. The software implemen-
tations of the tSDN, RSM, and FRVM were measured in terms of security
and performance. The resultant metrics were analysed using inferential and
descriptive statistics, using a statistical computing platform, R [35]. The de-
velopment environment and additional libraries are summarised, along with
versions, in Table 3.1.
3.5 Network Configuration
For the realistic evaluation of FRVM, the controller was deployed onto a
virtualised network, constructed with Mininet [26]. The security and per-
formance of the tSDN, RSM, and FRVM controllers was measured on the
virtualised network. Mininet provides the ability to create large virtualised
networks that are portable, do not require expensive hardware, and are eas-
ily shareable for others to confirm results. Off the shelf, Mininet provides
pre-made network elements such as hosts, OpenFlow switches, and SDN
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TABLE 3.1: Software specifics of the development environment
for the thesis.
Detail Info
Hypervisor Oracle VM VirtualBox 5.2.12
Operating System Ubtuntu 17.10
Central Processing Unit Intel i7-3770K @ 4.20 GHz
Programming language Python 2.7.14
Data processing language R v3.5.1
Network virtualisation Mininet v2.2.2
SDN Controller software Ryu v4.25
OpenFlow version 1.2
OpenFlow switch version 2.8.1
Network scanner Nmap 7.60
Packet dissector Wireshark 2.4.2
Integrated Development Environment PyCharm Community 2018
FIGURE 3.3: Illustrates the basic topology of the virtualised net-
work containing a user, router, switches, SDN controller, and
protected servers. A key is given on the left to separate the
links used for data flow and control flow.
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controllers. All network elements run a Linux sub-system that operates real-
world protocols and applications. Alternatives to Mininet included an ab-
stracted network platform that simulated relevant network mechanisms, or
a physical SDN-based network. The abstracted network platform would not
have captured how FRVM effects existing real-world network infrastructure,
therefore, avoiding a realistic implementation of FRVM. Whereas, FRVM was
not deployed on a physical SDN-based network due to time constraints re-
lated to the configuration of physical network elements. Mininet was pre-
ferred over both options due to the ease of configuration and the use of real-
world applications, protocols, and off the shelf network elements.
The basic topology of the virtualised network is shown in Figure 3.3. The net-
work contained a router, outside user, SDN controller, OpenFlow switches,
and protected servers. The router divided the two networks, one containing
an outside user and the other a SDN-based network. The division of net-
works simulated the outside user connecting from the Internet. The tSDN,
RSM, and FRVM controllers were each deployed in a network with this topol-
ogy. The protected servers were unaware of the SDN controller’s operation.
Small variations on this network were used for measuring security and per-
formance of the tSDN, RSM, and FRVM controllers. The alterations made to
the network for security and performance testing are described in the follow-
ing subsections.
3.5.1 Modifications for Security Testing
Security is a large concern for FRVM, the virtualised network needed to be
capable of testing reconnaissance and access of an outside attacker. For secu-
rity testing, the outside user become an outside attacker configured to use a
network scanner, Nmap [28]. The links were configured with artificial delays
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to simulate roundtrip delay. The internal and external links were configured
with 1ms and 30ms delays, respectively.
3.5.2 Modifications for Performance Testing
The performance of the tSDN, RSM, and FRVM controllers was measured
with the duration of TCP file transfers over different levels of network load.
Measuring the durations required minor modifications to the virtualised net-
work such as the addition of more hosts and bandwidth restrictions on the
simulated links. Additional hosts were added both outside and inside of the
network. The hosts were connected to the network via the switches, in a
round-robin with the switches, although the number of switches was held
constant at three. The bandwidth on all the internal network links was re-
stricted to 100Mb/s whereas the outbound link was restricted to 10Mb/s.
The outbound links were restricted to a lower speed than internal links to
simulate the speed difference between Internet connections and Local Area
Network (LAN) bandwidth. The links were restricted to ensure the TCP
acted normally within the virtualised network. Normally the TCP needs to
deal with issues such as random delays and packet loss although these were
not modelled by the virtualised network, due to their inherent randomness
obscuring data.
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3.6 SDN Controller Implementations
The aim of the thesis was to evaluate a software implementation of FRVM in
realistic conditions and compare it with pre-existing analytical results. There-
fore, FRVM was implemented with Ryu [37], a NOS, and deployed on a vir-
tualised SDN controller. Additionally, the results collected from FRVM were
compared with results from the tSDN and RSM controllers, requiring a soft-
ware implementation of both.
Alternative solutions to Ryu for communicating through OpenFlow include
implementing OpenFlow communication or utilising one of the many avail-
able NOSs. Firstly, the use of a pre-implemented OpenFlow communication
was a necessity due to the complexity of the OpenFlow protocol and time
restrictions of this thesis. Secondly, the chosen NOS had to provide a Python
API for ease of development and support higher versions of OpenFlow to
allow expansion of FRVM. There are alternatives that meet these restrictions
other than Ryu such as Floodlight [11]. Ultimately, Ryu was chosen for its
complete documentation, open source codebase, and additional helper li-
braries including a packet decoder for major network protocols.
Ryu handled setup configurations such as the OpenFlow handshake with the
OpenFlow switches and provided an API with methods for communication
between the controller and switches with the OpenFlow protocol. Important
OpenFlow communication packets included packet-in, packet-out, and flow-
mod [32]. Packet-in is sent from a switch to the controller in the event of a
flow table miss in the sending switch. A flow table miss occurs if a packet
arrives at a switch but there is no forwarding table rule that matches the
arrived packet. Packet-out contains a packet for the data plane in its payload
and is sent from a controller to a switch instructing the switch to forward the
packet out through a specified switch port. Packet-out allows the controller
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FIGURE 3.4: Demonstrates how an ARP exchange spreads
through a FRVM deployed network, specifically how the vIP
address is mapped at network edge of server 2.
to route packets through switches. Flow-mod is an essential configuration
packet that allows the controller to install new flow rules in switches, thus
installing missing flows and facilitating routing in a network. Specifics of the
implementations of the three controllers are outlined in the following sub-
sections.
3.6.1 FRVM Controller
The FRVM controller is a software implementation of the MTD technique de-
scribed by Dilli et al. [42] and Section 3.2. FRVM implements transparent
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FIGURE 3.5: Demonstrates the contents of switch flow tables
after routing a packet between user A and Server 2 for a FRVM
deployed network.
Algorithm 1: Pseudo code for the FRVM controller’s vIP address gener-
ation.
Allocations = {};
for all hosts h in protected network do
for all services s for h do
do
Generate vIP;
while (vIP, s.port) not in Allocations.vIPpairs();
Allocations[(h.rIP, s.port)] = (vIP, s.port);
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Algorithm 2: Pseudo code for the FRVM controller.
Generate vIP addresses for all hosts;
Create timer for next address mutation;
for all Packet-in packets p from OFswitches do
if p contains an ARP or IP packet from hi to hj then
if OFswitch is edge switch for [hi,hj] then
Install in flow in src OFswitch
action set srcIP(p) := vIP(hi, p.src_port) and
dstIP(p) := rIP(hj, p.dst_port);
Install out flow in src OFswitch
action set srcIP(p) := p.dst_IP and
dstIP(p) := pkt.src_IP;
Output p in Packet-out to src OF-switch;
else if OFswitch is edge switch for hi then
p.src_IP = vIP(hi);
Output p in Packet-out to src OF-switch for flooding;
else if OFswitch is edge switch for hj then
Install in flow in src OFswitch
action set srcIP(p) := p.dst_IP
Output p through OFswitch input port;
Install out flow in src OFswitch
action set dstIP(p) := rIP(hj, p.dst_port);
Output p in Packet-out to src OF-switch through hi
connected port;
else if p.dst_IP is not rIP and p.dst_IP is vIP then
Install in and out flow in src OFswitch;
Output p in Packet-out to src OFswitch flooded;
if timer has elapsed then
Create timer for next address mutation;
Generate vIP for all hosts and port combinations;
Expire current flows;
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IP address mutation and multiplexing. Address mutation involves periodi-
cally changing vIP addresses of hosts. Address multiplexing allows multiple
vIP addresses to be assigned per rIP address, by using port numbers to dis-
cern between the multiple vIP addresses. It follows that FRVM must match
packets on the network and transport layers to enable address mutation and
multiplexing. The vIP address generation is detailed in Algorithm 1, where
random numbers are generated with a cryptography secure method using
randomness collected by the Operating System (OS). FRVM Modifies ARP
and IP packets. Specifically, source and destination IP address fields of ARP
and IP packets are modified by the FRVM controller and switches at the net-
work edge. A high-level interpretation of the implemented FRVM technique
is shown Algorithm 2.
Solutions for Existing Network Infrastructure
Whilst creating a software implementation of FRVM, ambiguities in the tech-
nique specification [42], as described in Subsection 3.2.3, needed solutions be-
fore a software implementation could be deployed on a network with exist-
ing network infrastructure. These ambiguities included router address ran-
domisation and ARP address randomisation.
Routers in the FRVM protected network were not allocated vIP addresses.
This meant the routers were contacted through their rIP addresses and the
protection of FRVM was not afforded to the routers. Although as routers
stitch networks together, they would be reachable through an interface on
the connected non-protected network, therefore, the loss of protection is min-
imal. Without a vIP address, the routers have a static IP address allowing
hosts within the network to use them as default gateways.
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Algorithm 3: FRVM’s multiplexing and demultiplexing with ARP, a
portless protocol.
Initialise ARP_stack;
for all Packet-in packets p from OFswitches do
if p is a ARP packet from hi to hj then
if OFswitch is edge switch for hi and ARP is a response then
p.src_IP = ARP_stack.pop();
else if OFswitch is edge switch for hj and ARP is a request then
ARP_stack.push(p.dst_IP);
ARP translates MAC addresses to IP addresses within a network, this func-
tionality is necessary for end-to-end communication. Ideally, ARP packets
would be treated in a similar fashion to IP packets, multiplexing and de-
multiplexing between vIP and rIP addresses, as shown in Figure 3.4. Un-
fortunately, multiplexing relies on the inclusion of port numbers, of which
ARP packets have none. The solution involved implementing a queue for
each host to identify which vIP address of a host, an ARP response should
be translated to at networks edge. The technique is detailed in Algorithm 3.
This solution could also be applied to other portless protocols like the ICMP.
3.6.2 tSDN Controller
Algorithm 4: Pseudo code for the tSDN controller.
initialise mac_to_port;
for all Packet-in packets p from OFswitches do
if p contains an Ethernet frame from hi to hj then
Add p.eth_src to mac_to_port for OFSwitch;
if p.eth_dst in mac_to_port for OFSwitch then
Install it and out flow in OFswitch;
else if OFswitch is edge switch for hi then
Output p in Packet-out to OF-switch for flooding;
3.6. SDN Controller Implementations 53
FIGURE 3.6: Demonstrates the contents of switch flow tables
after routing a packet between user A and Server 2 for a tSDN
deployed network.
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FIGURE 3.7: Demonstrates the contents of switch flow tables
after routing a packet between user A and Server 2 for a RSM
deployed network.
The tSDN controller implemented Ethernet-level routing on a SDN-based
network. The tSDN controller only modifies Ethernet packets and the con-
figuration is static, avoiding much of the complexity of both the MTD con-
trollers. A high-level interpretation of the tSDN controller is shown in the
Algorithm 4.
3.6.3 RSM Controller
The RSM controller implemented an address mutation technique similar to
FRVM, although protected hosts have a single vIP address rather than many.
Since RSM has a single vIP address per host, the simplex mapping functions
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Algorithm 5: Pseudo code for the RSM controller.
Generate vIP for all hosts;
Create timer for next address mutation;
for all Packet-in packets p from OFswitches do
if p contains an ARP or IP packet from hi to hj then
if OFswitch is edge switch for [hi,hj] then
Install in flow in src OFswitch
action set srcIP(p) := vIP(hi) and
dstIP(p) := rIP(hj);
Install out flow in src OFswitch
action set srcIP(p) := p.dst_IP and
dstIP(p) := pkt.src_IP;
Output p in Packet-out to src OF-switch;
else if OFswitch is edge switch for hi then
p.src_IP = vIP(hi);
Output p in Packet-out to src OF-switch for flooding;
else if OFswitch is edge switch for hj then
Install in flow in src OFswitch
action set srcIP(p) := p.dst_IP
Output p through OFswitch input port;
Install out flow in src OFswitch
action set dstIP(p) := rIP(hj);
Output p in Packet-out to src OF-switch through hi
connected port;
else if p.dst_IP is not rIP and p.dst_IP is vIP then
Install in and out flow in src OFswitch;
Output p in Packet-out to src OFswitch flooded;
if timer has elapsed then
Create timer for next address mutation;
Generate vIP for all hosts;
Expire current flows;
Algorithm 6: Pseudo code for RSM controller’s vIP generation.
Allocations = {};
for all hosts h in protected network do
Generate vIP not in Allocations.vIPs();
Allocations[rIP(h)] = vIP;
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domain and co-domain are
fsimplex : VIP→ RIP (3.9)
and de-simplex
fde−simplex : RIP→ VIP (3.10)
using the sets
RIP = {rIP1, rIP2, ..., rIPR} (3.11)
and
VIP = {vIP1, vIP2, ..., vIPV} (3.12)
where RIP and VIP are the sets of rIP addresses and vIP addresses respec-
tively. With a single vIP address per host, RSM doesn’t need port numbers
to identify the different vIP addresses. It follows that the simplex function
is one-to-one rather than many-to-one, like FRVM’s multiplexing. The RSM
controller generates and manages a pool of vIP addresses that it instructs
switches to map and forward. The RSM controller’s generation of vIP ad-
dresses follows Algorithm 6 with random numbers generated with a cryp-
tography secure method using randomness collected by the OS. After an ad-
dress mutation, the hosts’ vIP addresses are allocated from storage, and a
new set is generated for the next address mutation and moved into storage.
With OpenFlow, the RSM controller instructs switches how to forward and
map IP address fields of ARP and IP packets. For transparent mapping to the
hosts, RSM routes on the network layer [34] to allow matching via rIP and
vIP address fields. Specifically, the modified packets will be either ARP or
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IP packets. Similar to FRVM, ARP packets are modified to facilitate network
level communication. Although due to hosts having only one vIP address, a
queue approach is not needed. A high-level interpretation of RSM is shown
in Algorithm 5.
3.7 Measurement Instruments
Measurements were taken on a virtualised network described in Section 3.5
and executed in the test environment specified in Table 3.1. The SDN con-
trollers used for the experiments are described in Section 3.6. Security and
performance testing used different methods due to the differing aims, the
measurement instruments for each are outlined separately in the following
subsections.
3.7.1 Measuring Security
FRVM defends networks with address mutation and multiplexing against
the first two links in the attack chain, reconnaissance and access [30]. Nmap [28],
an attacker tool, can perform both reconnaissance and access through its host
and port discovery. It follows that the level of security of tSDN, RSM, and
FRVM controllers was assessed using data logs from Nmap network scans
completing the two phases: host and port discovery.
Host discovery involves identifying a host within a network, usually with an
IP address. This uses common packets that are likely to receive a response,
like ICMP and common transport layer ports. This stage involves reducing
the number of potential hosts, to save time in port discovery. Port discovery
involves finding detailed information about the identified hosts through a
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series of port probes per host. Although it is not necessary to first complete
host discovery before port discovery, it dramatically reduces the total amount
of probes. Host discovery recorded the number of discovered ports per host.
Port discovery techniques uses transport layer protocols to discover open
ports on hosts, there are a multitude of techniques including UDP and many
TCP methods. A subset of the port scanning techniques, UDP and TCP con-
nect, SYN, FIN, NULL, and XMAS were chosen to meet the time restrictions
of the thesis. The UDP and TCP methods were chosen over other port scan-
ning techniques due to these transport protocols being more common than
alternatives. Port discovery recorded the number of open ports per host.
For the scans, Nmap measured the hosts discovered along with their detected
ports and the scan duration. The scanning speed of Nmap was decided by its
dynamic behaviour, setting a specific speed was avoided as fast scans can be
easily detected. Nmap was chosen over alternatives such as Nessus [2] due to
its well-documented use, popularity with both attackers and defenders [28],
and familiarity with the tool allowing time constraints of the thesis to be met.
3.7.2 Measuring Performance
Performance was measured with the duration of TCP file transfers. Small
delays were avoided, like latency caused by OpenFlow mechanisms, due to
the small times. For these small delays, it was difficult to discern differences
between the SDN controllers due to the virtualised network causing small
measurement error that obscured the differences. The server and client were
positioned inside and outside of the SDN-based network respectively. The
TCP client and server were implemented in Python, recording the transfer
duration using the time since the Linux epoch. Timers that record Central
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Processing Unit (CPU) time typically have a finer accuracy resolution but do
not record blocking calls commonly used in networking and thus were not
appropriate. The timing method used had a resolution of approximately 1ms
and due to the magnitude of file transfer durations, it was appropriate.
3.8 Data Collection
FRVM is a MTD security technique proposed to defend against network re-
connaissance and access. Security and performance testing were conducted
on the FRVM controller to demonstrate its capabilities and discover future
research directions. Data collection is split into two categories: security and
performance testing. In both sections, FRVM was compared with the tSDN
and RSM controllers described in Subsections 3.6.2 and 3.6.3, respectively.
3.8.1 Security Testing
The aim of security testing was to demonstrate and verify the defence of
FRVM through evaluation alongside software implementations of the tSDN,
RSM, and FRVM controllers with a real-world attacker tool, specifically a
network scanner Nmap. Despite FRVM currently lacking any considerations
for TCP connections, as discussed in Subsection 3.2.3, this did not affect the
validity of the security testing data. TCP scanning either doesn’t create a
connection or creates a very short-lived connection, for the case of the TCP
connect scan. The security of FRVM was measured through the success of
Nmap scanning on a FRVM protected network relative to the tSDN and RSM
networks. The attacker’s success was measured by the level of information
disclosure and scan duration. Information disclosure is expressed in terms
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of the host and port discovery. The duration of the scan directly effects the
amount of attacker gathered information that remains valid at the end of the
scan.
Host discovery
Host discovery involves identifying a host within a network, usually with an
IP address. Although it is not necessary to first complete host discovery be-
fore port discovery, it dramatically reduces the total amount of work. Nmap
offers many end-to-end host discovery methods including ICMP, ARP, UDP,
and various TCP probes. The host discovery method for security testing had
to be capable of detection over the Internet, discounting ARP probes. The re-
maining scans all function over IP and therefore can discover hosts over the
Internet. Ultimately, the default options in Nmap were chosen due to their
common use and the modelled attacker is unaware of MTD. The defaults in-
clude multiple probes: ICMP echo and timestamp request and TCP SYN and
ACK packets.
The design of FRVM avoids host discovery through its address multiplexing,
as discussed in Subsection 3.2.2. For this reason, host discovery is disabled in
scans against FRVM, meaning each network scan begins with port discovery
assuming all hosts in the IP subnetwork are active. For analysis of scans on
a FRVM deployed network, a host was considered discovered if any number
of ports had been discovered on that host.
Port discovery
Security testing with Nmap used TCP and UDP port scanning techniques. Of
the TCP scan, five sub-types were tested: TCP connect, SYN, NULL, FIN, and
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Xmas [28]. Several different port scanning techniques were used to discover
those that posed the largest risk against the FRVM controller. For the MTD
controllers, RSM and FRVM, it seemed likely that faster scans would be the
most threatening as these would minimise the number of address mutations
that could occur during a scan. The most threatening scans were found using
an address mutation interval of 300 seconds, as performing all scan types
for multiple address mutation intervals was out of the scope of this thesis.
After finding the most threatening scans, these were performed on the MTD
controllers for a variety of address mutation intervals to discover the effect
on information disclosure. The tested address mutation intervals were 30, 90,
180, and 300 seconds.
Scanning Strategies
The duration and information disclosure were recorded for each network
scan, taken from the perspective of the attacker. The duration of the scan
was simply the time between the attacker beginning and ending the scan.
Information disclosure was measured by the number of discovered hosts and
open ports. The effect of address mutation and multiplexing was measured
with two different scanning strategies: scans run until completion and scans
run for a single address mutation interval.
Scans that were run until completion, or full scans, could experience any
number of address mutations throughout the scan. This analysed effects on
an ongoing scan that was not MTD aware. Specifically, full scans provided
the effects of address mutation and multiplexing on extended duration and
obfuscation of information disclosure. Full scans begun at any point after an
address mutation, this assumed the attacker either was not aware of the MTD
protection or unable to predict the movements. Unfortunately, full scans do
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not fully describe the information disclosure such as the amount that can be
found in a single address mutation interval. This is because the information
is obscured between intervals, leading to false numbers of hosts and ports.
Scans that were run for a single address mutation interval, or partial scans,
found the level of information disclosure that could be obtained before it
expires. This analysed the difference between the MTD controllers due to
address multiplexing. Additionally, partial scans analyse the amount of data
that could be collected before anything expires. The tSDN controller was
excluded from partial scans, as it doesn’t apply dynamics and therefore the
time restriction does not apply.
Security Testing Configuration
All the SDN controllers were tested on the same virtualised network de-
scribed in Section 3.5. The network contained three switches, an outside
user, a network controller, and a variable number of protected hosts. Each
protected host randomly opened 10 ports in the inclusive range of 50000-
50999. This range was assumed to contain the 1000 most likely open ports,
although for simplicity was consolidated into a single block. For TCP scans,
the open ports operated a HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) server, im-
plemented in Python [44], to respond to the connection requests of the TCP
scans. For UDP scans the open ports offered an echo service, as Nmap UDP
scans detect open ports on any response. The port numbers of offered ser-
vices were generated with a cryptography secure random number generator.
The user outside of the network was modelled as an attacker performing a
Nmap scan using its default dynamic behaviour. The attacker scanned over
the range 50000-50999 over a class C IP address range. This assumed the at-
tacker knew the subnet size of the network and the port range of randomly
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opened ports. The subnet size could be guessed from the subnet of an adver-
tised address using utilities like Whois [7]. The port range was known from
a list of well-known ports [28], as the host’s ports were within the 1000 most
likely open ports. Finally, the router was excluded from the attackers scan as
FRVM doesn’t protect the networks routers, as described in Subsection 3.6.1.
3.8.2 Performance Testing
Inherently FRVM will cause an additional delay by managing, mutating, and
multiplexing between the vIP and rIP address spaces. To better understand
FRVM’s performance repercussions, its effect was measured with respect to
the duration of file transfers over TCP. In the file transfer, protected hosts
acted as servers and hosts outside of the SDN network acted as clients. The
duration of file transfers was measured from the start of the download un-
til the complete file had been transferred, from the perspective of the client.
Address mutations were not considered whilst measuring the file transfer
of FRVM because currently there is no solution for connection dropouts be-
tween address mutations, as explained in Section 3.2.3.
The overhead of the SDN controllers was further analysed by measuring the
average duration of file transfer for multiple servers whilst under network
load. The network load was varied with the number of concurrent file trans-
fers. Specifically, two methods were used: increasing the number of servers
and increasing the number of file transfers from a server.
All file transfers were measured on the virtualised network described in
Section 3.5. The network contained three switches and a variable number
of users and protected servers. Both the client and server communicated
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through TCP to transfer a 100MB file from the server to the client. Delays as-
sociated to resolving a domain name were not counted towards the duration
of the transfer.
3.9 Data Analysis
Data was arranged in terms of research problems and interesting properties
found in testing. All the data analysis was performed with a statistical com-
puting language, R. The security and performance data were analysed with
explanatory analysis and failure time analysis respectively.
3.9.1 Security Analysis
The measuring instrument for security testing was Nmap. Nmap scans out-
put data for each host on the network. To simplify the interpretation of the
results, metrics were aggregated per network scan. For example, the number
of open ports found per host was computed as an average over a network
scan. Due to the dynamic behaviour of Nmap’s scanning strategies in con-
junction with the effects of address mutation and multiplexing the collected
data had high variability. Rather than attempting to fit a model to the vari-
able data, an exploratory approach was taken. This involved describing the
shape, centrality, and variability without distributional assumptions. Visu-
alising data is especially important for exploratory statistics, an R package
called ggplot [50] was helpful in generating the visual plots used to describe
the scan data. Whilst visualising the data, outliers were removed on a per
scan type basis using the scan duration metric. The outliers were removed
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were counted as outliers and removed from the data set, where Q1 and Q3
are the lower and upper quartiles, respectively.
3.9.2 Performance Analysis
Performance testing data measured the duration of an event thus failure time
analysis could be applied. Specifically, a class of semi-parametric survival
models called the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) models [25]. As AFT mod-
els are semi-parametric, the models can vary based on the distribution of
their error variable. The distribution of an AFT model effects the data it can
fit, thus the most appropriate distribution was chosen through model selec-
tion with the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). It follows that the distri-
bution was chosen by the fitted model that had the minimum AIC value.
The AFT models were fitted to the data and analysed using the R packages:
survival [48] and flexsurv [20]. AFT models are log-linear; therefore, the pro-
portional difference of the coefficients was found with the following.
%∆Y = 100× (eβi − 1) (3.15)
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Where Y, X, and βi are the response, explanatory, and coefficient variables,
respectively. The coefficients are interpreted differently due to the multiplica-
tive way in which the covariates of a log-linear model act on the response
variable. The means of different groups were computed from the fitted AFT
models and confidence intervals were found through simulations on the nor-
mal asymptotic distribution. Hypothesis testing was performed to conclude
a difference between the controllers. Firstly, an omnibus method was used to
reduce the chance of a Type 1 error, followed by individual pairwise tests.
3.10 Reproducibility of the Experiment
The reproducibility of this thesis is ensured by including the entire reposi-
tory of source code including Python and R files, raw data, and other related
materials. The Python code includes the configuration of the virtualised net-
work, implementation of SDN controllers, and written tests for measuring se-
curity and performance. The R code includes the data preparation and analy-
sis of security and performance. There is a large quantity of raw data related
to security analysis, in the form of Nmap’s Extensible Markup Language
(XML) output. The repository is available at https://drive.google.com/
open?id=1q-73XFdXTqmaLG8mK0uh5qbk8pI5T8Ah, or alternatively the reposi-
tory could be requested by emailing coledishington@gmail.com.
3.11 Summary
Flexible Random Virtual IP Multiplexing (FRVM) is a Moving Target Defence
(MTD) technique that defends against reconnaissance and access through ad-
dress mutation and multiplexing although the technique remains theoretical.
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It follows that all analysis performed has been analytical, without considera-
tions for real-world infrastructure. This thesis performed realistic evaluation
of FRVM deployed on a virtualised network alongside real-world protocols.
The evaluation was performed with respect to security and performance.
For comparison with FRVM, two additional Software Defined Networking
(SDN) controllers were implemented: the typical Software Defined Network
and Random Simplex vIP Mapper.
Security testing involved an attacker outside of the SDN-based network scan-
ning for hosts and their open ports using a variety of port scanning tech-
niques. The most potent port scanning technique was found with an address
mutation interval of 300 seconds. Scans with the most potent port scan-
ning technique were then carried out on a variety of address mutation in-
tervals. The resultant data was aggregated per network and analysed with
exploratory statistics.
Performance testing involved measuring the extra delay between a server
and client, with different MTD controllers deployed server side. Addition-
ally, the effect of an increased number of servers and concurrent connections
to a server were individually analysed to discover how FRVM performed
under different levels of network load. The resultant data was analysed with
survival analysis, using an accelerated failure time model chosen through





The software implementation of Flexible Random Virtual internet protocol
Multiplexing (FRVM) was deployed on a virtualised network to obtain se-
curity and performance data. Additionally, security and performance data
were collected for the typical Software Defined Network (tSDN) and Ran-
dom Simplex internet protocol Mapper (RSM) controllers, for comparison
with FRVM. The security data was collected from network scans of the vir-
tualised networks. The performance data was collected from the duration of
file transfers, over the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), at varying levels
of network load.
This chapter will outline the preparation of data and conversion to results.
Analysis of the results will demonstrate the security and performance trade-
off and validate the pre-existing analytical results [42].
4.1 Security Analysis
FRVM is a Moving Target Defence (MTD) technique devised to protect a net-
work against reconnaissance and access. The defence of FRVM was verified
through network scanning where the extra protection gained from FRVM
70 Chapter 4. Results and Analysis
was judged by scanning and comparing results with the tSDN and RSM con-
trollers. The ability of network scans was judged with two different scan-
ning strategies: full and partial scans. Full scans were run until the scan
completed, often experiencing multiple address mutations while scanning
the MTD controllers. Whereas partial scans were run for a single muta-
tion interval. The tSDN controller was excluded from all partial scans as
it doesn’t apply dynamics, therefore, the restriction to a mutation interval
doesn’t apply. Network scanning offers many port scanning techniques, the
most formidable of which was found by comparing scans of tSDN, RSM,
and FRVM networks between the different port scanning techniques. After
finding the most threatening port scanning technique, scans were conducted
against the RSM and FRVM controllers for multiple different mutation in-
tervals to analysis its effect. The following outlines the preparation of scan
data, comparison of multiple port scanning techniques, and the effect of dif-
ferent mutation intervals. All analysis of the data was performed through
exploratory statistics involving visual displays rather than relying on distri-
butional assumptions and summary metrics. This approach was taken due
to the large variability in the data, caused by Nmap’s dynamic scanning be-
haviour in conjunction with address mutation and multiplexing.
4.1.1 Data Preparation
The raw data of the Nmap scans performed by an outside attacker was in the
form of Extensible Markup Language (XML) files. This contained data on the
scan and discovered hosts such as scan protocol, number of discovered hosts,
and the status of their ports. The data was filtered and processed down to
the metrics: number of discovered hosts, average number of open ports per
host, and scan duration. For scans that disabled host discovery, hosts were
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considered discovered if any number of ports had been discovered. As the
data was collected per network, the number of open ports per host had to
be aggregated. Aggregating the open ports per host involved averaging the
total number of open ports discovered over the total number of hosts in the
network. Outliers were removed based on the scan duration by using the
interquartile range per scan type, as described in Section 3.9. Each scan type
sample distribution only contained outliers that were larger, due the address
mutation massively increasing the duration of scans. These were removed as
they were not representative of the scan types ability.
4.1.2 Comparison of Multiple Port Scanning Techniques
Attackers have a variety of port scanning techniques available for probing
inside of networks to learn information to launch an attack. During secu-
rity analysis, TCP and UDP port scans were performed on networks with
each of the SDN controllers deployed. This demonstrated the differences be-
tween the port scanning techniques, with respect to information disclosure
and duration. The port scanning techniques were compared with a mutation
interval of 300 seconds for the RSM and FRVM controllers, this allowed the
effect of movement to be discovered whilst dramatically reducing the num-
ber of samples. The following covers the full and partial scanning strategies
for comparing the multiple port scanning techniques.
Full Scans
The analysis of the full scan results for different scan types are split into host
discovery, port discovery, and scan duration. The RSM controller was con-
figured with a mutation interval of 300 seconds. The results of two full scans
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FIGURE 4.1: The sample distributions of the number of dis-
covered hosts from full scans on tSDN and RSM deployed net-
works, with multiple scan types. RSM was configured with an
address mutation of 300 seconds. The dashed line marks the
number of hosts in the network.
Scan Type Duration Up Hosts Average Open
Ports Per Host
TCP SYN 118351.59 58 12.60
TCP CONNECT 50375.64 35 8.20
TABLE 4.1: Full scans collected from a FRVM deployed net-
work with an address mutation of 300 seconds. Identical to the
scans on the tSDN and RSM, there were 5 hosts, each with 10
open ports.
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FIGURE 4.2: The sample distributions of the average number of
discovered open ports per host discovered from full scans on
tSDN and RSM deployed networks, with multiple scan types.
RSM was configured with an address mutation of 300 seconds.
The dashed line marks the number of open ports per host in the
network.
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(A) Large range
(B) Shortened range
FIGURE 4.3: The sample distributions of the duration of Nmap
scans on tSDN and RSM deployed networks, with multiple
scan types. RSM was configured with an address mutation of
300 seconds. The two sub-figures show the same data on differ-
ent x-axis ranges.
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for FRVM are shown in Table 4.1, as can be seen, these scans have a very
large duration leading to only single samples. Although the effect of address
movement on network scans can be extrapolated from scans against the RSM
deployed network.
The sample distributions of host and port discovery for tSDN and RSM de-
ployed networks are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. Immediately
it is clear that the scans against the tSDN network have no variability in the
number of hosts or ports discovered, with all the scans finding the maximum
number of hosts and ports. Whereas against the RSM network, host discov-
ery for TCP connect is spread and port discovery for all scans are spread. For
UDP and TCP FIN, host discovery on the RSM network is constant at 5 dis-
covered hosts. The most variable host discovery scan was TCP connect, with
most points between 2 and 5; whereas the other scan types having almost
all scans discovering 5 hosts. Port discovery scans against the RSM network
are spread in the range of 0 to 24.8, meaning some of scans against the RSM
network detected more open ports than there was in the network. This oc-
curred a small number of times for all scan types except UDP, in which the
majority of port scans found over 10 open ports. This suggests address mu-
tation produces high obfuscation in UDP scans. Comparing the medians of
the scan types, both TCP connect and UDP scans median are closest to the
true number of open ports in the network. Although the TCP connect scans
are spread below 10 whereas UDP’s are spread between 8 and 24.8.
The sample distributions of scan duration for tSDN and RSM deployed net-
works is shown in Figure 4.3. These two snapshots of the same plot, with
different x-axis ranges, show the full variability of the scan durations for
RSM and compare large point clusters, respectively. Immediately, it is clear
that the scan duration on the RSM network is hugely variable, especially
in comparison to the tight clusters of durations produced by scanning the
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tSDN network. Additionally, the RSM network scans are strongly positively
skewed, indicating that a small portion of scans for each scan type are much
more effected than others. The most variable scan durations are the TCP
XMAS, TCP NULL, and TCP FIN. This suggests that address mutation is
affecting the duration of port scanning techniques. The TCP connect scan
durations are clustered, even for the RSM network. Further, the TCP connect
scan duration for the RSM network is clustered lower than all other scans
types, including those scanning the tSDN network. The TCP connect scan on
the RSM network likely has such low variability due to its speed, allowing it
to finish with a minimal number of address mutations. In fact, the majority
of TCP connect scans on RSM had durations lower than the mutation inter-
val. Focusing on the TCP connect scan, both tSDN and RSM scan durations
cluster around the same point with slightly more variance in the RSM scan.
This shows that even the TCP connect scan experienced address mutations
whilst scanning the RSM network. Further, the slightly increased variability
shows that TCP connect, and in fact all the tested port scanning techniques,
are affected by address mutation.
Focusing on FRVM, shown in Table 4.1, the two samples had much larger du-
rations than scans on the tSDN and RSM networks. Additionally, the num-
ber of open ports discovered was higher in both; due to the large number of
address mutations that occurred over the large scan duration shown by the
large number of hosts discovered.
Partial Scans
Partial network scans were performed against RSM and FRVM deployed net-
works to find the magnitude of information disclosure in a single mutation
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FIGURE 4.4: The sample distributions of the number of dis-
covered hosts within a single address mutation interval of 300
seconds on RSM and FRVM deployed networks, with multiple
scan types. The dashed line marks the number of hosts in the
network.
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FIGURE 4.5: The sample distributions of the average number of
discovered open ports per host; within a single address muta-
tion interval of 300 seconds on RSM and FRVM deployed net-
works, with multiple scan types. The dashed line marks the
number of open ports per host in the network.
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interval of 300 seconds, for the different port scanning techniques. The du-
rations were not analysed as these scans were restricted to finish within 300
seconds. Of particular interest was how FRVM’s multiplexing of virtual In-
ternet Protocol (vIP) addresses affected the network scans.
The sample distributions of host and port discovery for the RSM and FRVM
deployed networks is shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. The dashed lines are
positioned at the number of hosts and open ports per host in the network.
As the host discovery of Nmap was not enabled on FRVM due to its address
multiplexing, a host was considered discovered if a single port was found
during port discovery. However, no hosts or ports were discovered on the
FRVM network. Whereas scanning the RSM deployed network found some
success with TCP SYN and connect scans. TCP SYN found 2 hosts in two
of its scans and TCP connect found hosts in all scan samples with a posi-
tively skewed distribution ranging from 2 to 5. The number of discovered
hosts was mostly on the lower end of the range with few scans discovering
5 hosts. Additionally, port scanning is similarly positively skewed, although
the clusters of TCP connect are separated by one point due to the aggrega-
tion of port scanning results. The skew shows that most of the points are
below 10, the true number of open ports per host in the network; although a
small amount at the end of its tail find 10 open ports. These results suggest
that both RSM and FRVM provide protection against most of the scan types.
However, without address multiplexing RSM could not fully protect against
TCP connect although it did obfuscate many of the scans. Whereas, FRVM
evaded all scans, including TCP SYN and connect due to its increased search
space from address multiplexing.
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Summary
Full and partial scans were conducted on the SDN controllers, to discover the
most threatening scan. This was judged by the level of information disclosure
and scan duration against address mutation and multiplexing. The tSDN,
RSM, and FRVM controllers corresponded to three different security levels:
no protection, address mutation, and the combination of address mutation
and multiplexing, respectively. The following outlines a brief outline of how
the controllers compare, explanation of UDP scans, and the most formidable
scan type.
Without protection, network scans discovered all information in the target
network, with highly consistent scan durations. The addition of address mu-
tation caused high variability in the number of open ports discovered by all
scans; suggesting that address mutation reduced the possibility of detect-
ing open ports and validity of discovered ports. Further, address mutation
caused an increase in scan duration, especially for the longer scan types as
more address mutations could occur within the scan. Although TCP con-
nect was not as affected as the other scans due to its speed. The speed
of TCP connect, avoided sustaining as many address mutations. Addition-
ally, other scan types have extremely variable and drawn-out durations. Fi-
nally, address mutation and multiplexing caused further difficulty, resulting
in tremendously large durations for the small number of collected full scan
samples. With partial scans, the extra protection afforded by multiplexing
avoided even a single open port being detected within a single address mu-
tation interval. Unfortunately, many open ports were discovered on all net-
works on the full scans. This suggests that further defence should be added
to FRVM.
The UDP scans inaccuracy was demonstrated in the full scans against the
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RSM controller. The detected number of open ports was consistently higher
than the true number of open ports. This revealed UDP’s detection method;
port probes that do not receive a response mark an open port. This assump-
tion is valid for static systems although address mutation violates this as-
sumption. If an address movement occurs whilst scanning a host, all remain-
ing ports will be detected as open. This obfuscates the discovered informa-
tion and further slows the scans progress.
The full scans suggest that TCP SYN and connect can discover the most in-
formation although TCP connect completes much faster. It follows that af-
ter the completion of TCP connect, more of the information would be valid
as less address mutations have occurred. This was further demonstrated in
the partial scans, with TCP connect discovering far more information than
other scans within a single mutation interval. For these reasons, TCP con-
nect was marked as the most threatening scan. Although the results for scan-
ning FRVM did not suggest the most suited scan for an attacker to overcome
address multiplexing. However, FRVM uses address mutation as well, there-
fore TCP connect would threaten FRVM too. With this knowledge, further
scans were performed with TCP connect at multiple mutation intervals for
the MTD controllers: RSM and FRVM.
4.1.3 The Effect of Different Mutation Intervals
Section 4.1.2 explored the different port scanning techniques and the threat
posed by their ability to scan the SDN-based network with different con-
trollers. After comparing the scans, the most threatening was TCP connect
as it collected more information due to its relatively quick duration, shown
in both scan strategies. Due to the threat of TCP connect, more scans were
performed on the network whilst varying the address mutation intervals of
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the MTD controllers between 30, 90, 180, and 300 seconds. This captured the
effect of smaller mutation intervals on the most formidable scan type. Simi-
lar to comparing the scan types, the mutation intervals were analysed using
the two different scanning strategies: full and partial scans. The full scans
analysed the effect of different mutation intervals on RSM networks. The
partial scans analysed how much information could be gained in different
sized mutation intervals on RSM and FRVM networks.
Full Scan
Full network scans were conducted on a RSM deployed network, with multi-
ple mutation intervals to analyse their effect on the obfuscation of discovered
network information and extension of scan duration. Neither the tSDN or
FRVM networks had full scans performed for different MTD intervals. The
tSDN controller was excluded as it is static and doesn’t apply any dynam-
ics whereas the FRVM controller’s scan duration was too large to collect the
necessary samples, as seen from Table 4.1. The effect of address mutation
on full network scans could be extrapolated from the scans against the RSM
network.
Interestingly, the sample distributions for host discovery, shown in Figure 4.6,
remain a consistent shape through the mutation intervals 90, 180, and 300
seconds with only small variation and all with the highest peak at 5 hosts.
Whereas the size of the peak at 5 hosts is significantly smaller for a muta-
tion interval of 30 seconds. This suggests that the larger mutation intervals
were not significantly different in terms of reconnaissance. The port discov-
ery, shown in Figure 4.7, also looks similar between mutation intervals of
90, 180, and 300 seconds, though not to the same degree as host discovery.
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FIGURE 4.6: The sample distributions of the number of discov-
ered hosts, using a full TCP connect scan, for different mutation
intervals on a network, with the RSM controller deployed. The
dashed line marks the number of hosts in the network.
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FIGURE 4.7: Sample distribution of the average number of dis-
covered open ports per host, using a full TCP connect scan, for
different mutation intervals on a network, with the RSM con-
troller deployed. The dashed line marks the number of open
ports per host in the network.
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FIGURE 4.8: Sample distribution of Nmap scan durations us-
ing the TCP connect scan, for different mutation intervals on a
network with the RSM controller deployed.
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Similar to host discovery, there is a clear difference between the mutation in-
terval of 30 seconds and the others. This suggests that without a frequent
enough mutation interval, the scan is not greatly affected. In both, the scans
found less information in most cases for the mutation interval of 30 seconds.
Unfortunately, there were still a significant amount of open ports that were
discovered on all scans.
The sample distribution for scan duration, shown in Figure 4.8, shows a clus-
ter of scans around 100 seconds with a positive skew that becomes smaller
as the mutation interval reduces through the levels. This suggests that in-
creased frequency of the address mutation, results in increased variance in
the scan duration. Upon a mutation interval of 30 seconds, there is no longer
a large cluster around 100 seconds. Rather, there are small clusters spread be-
low 300 seconds. This shows the increased variability in scan duration with
a 30 second mutation interval. Similar to the host and port discovery, the
scan duration suggests that the protection relies on an appropriately small
mutation interval.
Partial Scan
Partial network scans were performed on MTD deployed networks to anal-
yse how much information could be discovered within a single mutation in-
terval, for different sized intervals. The MTD controllers, RSM and FRVM,
were scanned for the different mutation intervals. The tSDN controller was
not included as it does not apply dynamics.
The sample distributions of host discovery for the different mutation inter-
vals is shown in Figure 4.9. Scans on the mutation intervals 90, 180, and 300
seconds have all of their samples in the range of 2 to 5 hosts for the RSM
network. Both 90 and 180 seconds are very similar and look approximately
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FIGURE 4.9: The sample distributions of the number of dis-
covered hosts within a single mutation interval of 30, 90, 180,
and 300 seconds on RSM and FRVM networks. The dashed line
marks the number of hosts in the network.
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FIGURE 4.10: Sample distributions of the average number of
discovered open ports per host using the TCP connect scan
within a single MTD interval of 30, 60, 90, 180, and 300 seconds
on a network with RSM and FRVM controllers. The dashed line
marks the number of open ports per host in the network.
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normal whereas 300 seconds is positively skewed. With a mutation interval
of 30 seconds, almost none of the hosts were discovered. Sample distribu-
tions of port discovery, shown in Figure 4.10, follow the same trend as host
discovery, both 90 and 180 seconds appearing very similar with 300 seconds
having a positive skew. Although the points are separated into single peaks
due to the ports being aggregated. That is, usually if a host is discovered all
its ports are discovered. Whereas, almost no open ports were found in scans
at a mutation interval of 30 seconds. Almost no hosts were discovered at a
mutation interval of 30 seconds, which likely aided this result. Both host and
port discovery were completely ineffective against FRVM, finding nothing in
all samples.
Summary
Both the full and partial scans suggested that a higher frequency address mu-
tation provided improved protection against network scans. This was shown
by the differences between a mutation interval of 30 seconds and mutation
intervals of 60, 90, and 180 seconds. Without address multiplexing, address
mutation occurring in the host discovery phase significantly reduced the
number of ports discovered. This suggested that a reactive approach should
be taken to ensure mutation occurs during host discovery. However, this did
not apply to address multiplexing, as host discovery is not effective, and all
hosts had to be port scanned. There are still many open ports discovered
on the RSM deployed network at an address interval of 30 seconds. This
suggests that the protection provided by address mutation can be effective
but is not enough by itself. FRVM, with the addition of address multiplex-
ing did not have any ports discovered within the partial scans. Again, this
shows improved security, but the full scans demonstrated that many open
ports can be discovered, even if they are not all valid at the end of the scan.
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This suggests that the addition of attacker aware protections to FRVM may
be necessary to provide strong protection. However, it seems likely that an
IDS could more easily detect scans against the MTD controllers due to their
extended durations and increased number of port probes.
4.2 Performance Analysis
FRVM is a security technique with the aim of protecting a SDN-based net-
work from an attacker although performance remains an important consid-
eration. Security techniques that do not have a fair security and performance
trade-off are not adopted [47]. The effect of the tSDN, RSM, and FRVM con-
trollers on network performance was measured using the duration of file
transfers over TCP at different network loads. Comparing the controllers
gave the performance cost of address mutation and multiplexing. Latency
and flow management delays were avoided as they could be obscured by
measurement error in the virtualised network.
4.2.1 Data Preparation
The duration of the file transfer was recorded by each of the outside users
downloading a 100MB file from protected servers. Under load there were
multiple durations, measured for each user’s connection. The durations of
the concurrent connections were aggregated into single metrics by averaging
the connection durations by the total number of connections. Whilst mea-
suring file transfer, if any of the concurrent connections failed the data was
discounted. The data was discounted as it did not reflect the true network
load and the average of the connections could not be computed.
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TABLE 4.2: Summary statistics for the explanatory variables of
an AFT model fitted to the duration of TCP file transfer.
Variables Value Interpretation
of coefficient
Std. Error z value p value
is_tSDN -0.2198 -19.73 0.008552 -25.71 <0.0001
is_RSM -0.01221 -1.214 0.008552 -1.427 0.1534
Number
of servers
0.1027 10.81 0.001288 79.44 <0.0001
Ports per
server
0.04975 5.101 0.001288 38.64 <0.0001
TABLE 4.3: ANOVA chi-square tests to test the significance of
different SDN controller groups for the duration of TCP file
transfers at different levels of network load.
Terms Residence Df Deviance p-value
is_RSM + is_tSDN 1344 NA NA
Base 1346 -649.9 <0.0001
is_RSM + is_tSDN 1344 NA NA
is_tSDN 1345 -2.037 0.1535
is_tSDN 1345 NA NA
Base 1346 -647.9 <0.0001
4.2.2 Data Analysis
The file transfer measurements were taken on the virtualised network de-
scribed in Section 3.5. For the transfer, hosts inside of the network acted
as servers and outside hosts acted as clients. The bandwidth of simulated
links was restricted to 100Mb/s and 10Mb/s for links within the network
and links connecting to the network, respectively. Measurements were taken
from tSDN, RSM, and FRVM deployed networks to discover and analyse the
transfer delays and how they compared. Additionally, the effect of separately
increasing the number of concurrent servers and concurrent connections to
a server was explored to discover how well the SDN controllers could han-
dle increased load. Firstly, an Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model was
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FIGURE 4.11: A line plot of the duration of TCP file trans-
fer against the number of concurrent connections to different
servers. The points are means generated from the fitted AFT
model in Table 4.2, with the number of connections per server
held constant at one. The error bars shown are 95% confidence
intervals generated through simulations on the normal asymp-
totic distribution.
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FIGURE 4.12: A line plot of the duration of TCP file transfer
against the number of concurrent connections to a single server.
The points are means generated from the AFT model in Ta-
ble 4.2, with the number of servers held constant. The error bars
shown are 95% confidence intervals generated through simula-
tions on the normal asymptotic distribution.
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fit to the data using a log-normal distribution chosen through model selec-
tion using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to judge the models. Selection
was performed over weibull, exponential, gaussian, logistic, log-normal, and
log-logistic models. The fitted model identified the controller groups with






resulted in two dummy variables: is_tSDN and is_RSM. These modelled the
tSDN and RSM with FRVM as a reference. A summary of the fitted model
is shown in Table 4.2. AFT models are log-linear and thus the coefficients
needed to be transformed to find the proportion difference using the equa-
tion
%∆Y = 100× (eβi − 1) (4.2)
where Y, and βi are the response variable and coefficient of the ith explana-
tory variable in the fitted model, respectively. The proportional difference
is the percentage increase of the transfer duration. It follows that the fit-
ted model found that the download duration of tSDN and RSM deployed
networks reduced by 19.73% and 1.214% compared to the FRVM protected
network. This suggests the similarities, the address mutation, between the
RSM and FRVM controllers causes most of the extra delay on top of simple
Ethernet-level routing. Whereas the differences, being address multiplexing,
between the MTD controllers resulted in a minimal amount of extra delay.
This suggests that multiplexing vIP addresses does not cause a significant
4.2. Performance Analysis 95
difference in file transfer duration.
The controllers were tested under load by separately increasing the num-
ber of servers and connections to a server, the results are shown in Fig-
ures 4.11 and 4.12, respectively. The number of servers increased the down-
load duration for all controllers, although the MTD controllers had a steeper
increase that become more pronounced as the number of servers become
higher. For all points, the MTD controllers had larger transfer durations,
clearly indicating the performance trade-off. The transfer durations of the
RSM and FRVM networks increased at a similar rate with their points placed
within each other’s confidence intervals. The effect of multiple concurrent
connections to a single server did not increase in the same way, the increase
appeared linear. Although again the MTD controllers had very similar du-
rations that were consistently larger than the tSDN transfer duration. The
effect was likely less pronounced due to the single server slowing the rate
of the connections, it follows that the forwarding was not the bottleneck but
rather the server could not keep up with demand.
4.2.3 Hypothesis Testing
For testing the difference between the groups, likelihood ratio tests were used
to test the hypotheses
H0: The simpler model fits (4.3)
HA: The simpler model does not fit (4.4)
where H0 and HA are the null and alternative hypotheses, respectively. The
results of the likelihood ratio tests are summarised in Table 4.3. These tests
involve a complex and simple model. The simple model contains a subset of
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the explanatory variables contained in the complex model. If the null hypoth-
esis is rejected, the complex model fits and therefore the additional variables
are significant. The level of significance for accepting or rejecting the null hy-
pothesis will be 5%. The following models will use the variables xtSDN, xRSM,
xs, xp, and yD that correspond to is_tSDN, is_RSM, number of servers, ports
per service, and duration of file transfer. Suppose the complicated model
yD ∼ xs + xp + xtSDN + xRSM (4.5)
and the simpler model
yD ∼ xs + xp (4.6)
in a likelihood ratio test. The table shows the hypothesis test has a p-value
less than 0.001, this is very significant and therefore the null hypothesis can
be rejected. It follows that together the dummy variables identifying the con-
trollers are significant in the model. That is, the controllers have significantly
different file transfer durations. Although this test is an omni-bus method,
therefore pairwise tests must be conducted to find which variables are signif-
icantly different.
Suppose the complicated model
yD ∼ xs + xp + xtSDN + xRSM (4.7)
and the simpler model
yD ∼ xs + xp + xtSDN (4.8)
in a likelihood ratio test. The table shows the hypothesis test has a p-value
of 0.1535, this is not significant and therefore the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected. It follows that the simpler model is not significantly worse than the
complex model, meaning the MTD controllers, RSM and FRVM, file transfers
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durations are not significantly different.
Suppose the complicated model
yD ∼ xs + xp + xtSDN (4.9)
and the simpler model
yD ∼ xs + xp (4.10)
in a likelihood ratio test. The table shows the hypothesis test has a p-value
less than 0.001, this is significant and therefore the null hypothesis can be
rejected. It follows that the simpler model is significantly worse than the
complex model, meaning that the additional performance cost from the tSDN
to the MTD controllers is significant.
In summary, the duration of a file transfer is larger for networks where the
MTD controllers, RSM and FRVM, are deployed, with the effect increasing
upon larger network load. For a 100MB file, the difference between the
MTD controllers is not significant. These results provide evidence of the
performance loss of the RSM and FRVM controllers in comparison to sim-
pler SDN controllers. The gathered results did not consider mutation of ad-
dresses, rather the overhead of managing, matching, and modifying the vIP
addresses. After a solution for address mutation considering TCP connec-
tions has been devised, the overhead of address mutation would be expected
to increase. Lastly, the FRVM controller does not create significant perfor-
mance loss compared to the RSM controller.
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4.3 Discussion
FRVM is a MTD technique designed to prevent attacker reconnaissance and
access through address mutation in conjunction with address multiplexing.
The performance and security trade-off of FRVM was realistically evaluated
to validate the pre-existing analytical results [42]. The trade-off was obtained
by implementing FRVM and comparison controllers, and deploying them
on a virtualised network alongside real-world protocols. Whilst conducting
the experiment, this thesis aimed to answer three questions: what extra con-
siderations will need to be handled to implement and deploy FRVM? How
does FRVM affect security scanning in terms of information disclosure and
scan duration? What is the effect of FRVM on a network’s performance? The
following are addressed considering the results.
4.3.1 What Extra Considerations Will Need to Be Handled to
Implement and Deploy FRVM?
For implementing and deploying FRVM alongside common network infras-
tructure, extra considerations had to be made such as address mutation on
routers and address multiplexing over portless protocols like ARP. Address
mutation was not applied to the router to avoid hosts losing their default
routes. This change was considered minor, as routers have interfaces on
multiple networks and therefore would have non-randomised addresses on
attached networks. Address multiplexing was an additional protection of
FRVM to improve on past MTD techniques although it assumes the presence
of ports on all packets between hosts. Unfortunately, this is not the case and
ARP, an essential protocol for communication, is one such protocol. This in-
volved implementing a queue-based approach, identifying the vIP address
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that should be used based on the oldest ARP request that had not received a
response. This was not necessary in past address masking techniques [49, 41,
23, 22, 21] as there was only a single address per host. The trade-off of FRVM
is having a more complicated mapping function for a higher level of security,
the latter was shown through network scan results.
4.3.2 How Does FRVM Affect Security Scanning in Terms of
Information Disclosure and Scan Duration?
FRVM aims to protect against reconnaissance and access through address
mutation and multiplexing. The level of protection was judged by the amount
of information disclosure and duration of the scan. The information dis-
closure was measured by the amount of host and port information gained
through reconnaissance and access with a network scanning tool. The dura-
tion of the scan was included as a longer scan would have experienced more
address mutations resulting in less current information.
Analysis of security results found that address mutation obfuscated and hid
the network information, in addition to, dramatically increasing the dura-
tion of scans. With address multiplexing, the duration of scans was further
increased, resulting in more address mutations occurring throughout a scan.
Multiple scan types were trialed, finding that the TCP connect scan posed
the greatest threat against MTD using address mutation. However, with the
addition of address multiplexing all scans performed poorly due to a large
increase in scan duration. Whilst testing multiple scans, UDP was revealed
as a very inaccurate scan against address mutation due to its port detec-
tion method. Specifically, UDP scans detect an open port on no response,
although all probes elicit no response after an address mutation. Further,
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multiple different address mutation intervals showed that better protection
is afforded by controllers configured with higher frequency address muta-
tion; this agreed with past research into address mutation techniques [41,
22]. Although the effect of address mutation on scan duration was not grad-
ual, without a significantly small interval the results were very similar. This
effect appeared to be both due to the frequency of movement and the move-
ment occurring during host discovery. Although with address multiplexing,
host discovery could not be conducted and therefore doesn’t need to target
mutation towards host discovery.
Unfortunately, many ports were discovered through full scans. Although
most would have been expired and not usable for storage-based attacks like
hitlist worms; the attack could be launched immediately, or shortly after, the
discovery of a port. The benefit of FRVM, and thus address multiplexing, was
demonstrated by the large scan durations and evasion of detection within
single mutation intervals.
The past analytical research on FRVM [42] measured attack success prob-
ability against discovered hosts and number of scans where attack success
involves finding a host in the scan. That is, it considers a host exploited if
discovered rather than a port of the host discovered. These results and past
analytical results agree that FRVM provides better protection than a static
network, like the tSDN deployed network.
4.3.3 What Is the Effect of FRVM on a Network’s Performance?
The effect of the FRVM controller on network performance was analysed
through the duration of TCP file transfer between servers, in the SDN-based
network, and outside clients. The effect was judged through comparison
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with the typical Software Defined Network (tSDN) and Random Simplex vIP
Mapper (RSM) controllers, described in Section 3.6. These tests showed that
there was a significant performance difference between Ethernet-level for-
warding, used by the tSDN controller, and the MTD approaches, used by the
RSM and FRVM controllers. That is, the additional load of address mutation
is significant. Interestingly, a significant difference was not found between
the MTD controllers thus the addition of address multiplexing, on top of ad-
dress mutation, doesn’t cause a large difference to performance.
The analysis on performance found that address mutation increased the du-
ration of file transfers over TCP with the effect increasing upon larger net-
work load. This suggests a possible scalability issue and future research
should be conducted into optimising the address mutation.
Unfortunately, the analytical results composed for FRVM do not include per-
formance measures, although once created they can be compared with these
results. These results suggest that, with the security improvements, FRVM
would be preferred over similar techniques lacking address multiplexing as
the performance loss was shown to be insignificant.
4.3.4 Implications
The contributions of this thesis have implications in professional develop-
ment and future product development. The results show that the security
increase was greater than the performance loss of adding address multiplex-
ing. This could drive future research to include address multiplexing to im-
prove security and anonymity, especially after moving to IPv6 where extra
addresses will be abundant. With the lack of realistic evaluation in address
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masking MTD, the methodology could aid future researchers through eval-
uating past or present techniques. Additionally, future research into adap-
tations of FRVM on a realistic network could be aided through the method-
ology and codebase. With the rise of techniques like FRVM, future attackers
would need to train in MTD and design more complicated MTD aware recon-
naissance and access tools. Although due to the many configurable parame-
ters of FRVM allowing deployed networks to act differently, novice attackers
may struggle to use the more complex tools resulting in less attacks. Addi-
tionally, address mutations highly obfuscate UDP scans, which could lead
to a stop on access of UDP ports. The propagation of worms could be sig-
nificantly slowed due to the large scanning durations. Hitlist worms would
also be unlikely to spread effectively as the time to collect network informa-
tion is far greater than the longevity of FRVM protected host information.
Finally, with these results, and the pre-existing analytical results, showcas-
ing the effectiveness of FRVM, the existing networks could adopt the mecha-
nisms with improved trust.
4.4 Limitations of the Study
• The effect of random network disturbances such as queuing delays and
packet loss were not measured on FRVM.
• The implementation of FRVM used a simple random key generation
method that lacked performance optimisations and attacker awareness.
• Security and performance metrics were gathered on a virtualised net-
work, rather than a physical network. A physical network would pro-
duce more reliable results and allow the measurement of smaller de-
lays, like flow modification and latency.
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• Matching results for the improvement of FRVM’s security with port
randomisation were not obtained. These would provide evidence for a
change to FRVM’s specification.
• Security analysis did not consider the threat from exploits that spread
by spamming a particular port of any host. This attack doesn’t involve
the same level of reconnaissance, access, or development as the exploit
has already been chosen.
• Security analysis did not consider the effect of varying the number of
protected servers. Although open ports would still have been found,
the scan duration would be expected to increase.
• Neither security or performance analysis considered the addition of
multiple SDN controllers. Adding multiple SDN controllers would
likely improve the performance under network load. It could also limit
susceptibility to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by removing the cen-
trality of the SDN controller [40, 39, 5].
• Nmap [28] assumes a traditional network with static security. With ex-
tra considerations for MTD, the ability of an attacker to scan and learn
information could be improved.
• The chosen mutation intervals did not showcase when FRVM would
become exploitable, with respect to mutation intervals. This was wors-
ened by FRVM’s exclusion from full scans due to their large duration
and a limited period of time.
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4.4.1 Further Research
After conducting the evaluation of FRVM, the methodology and results sug-
gest paths for future research. Firstly, an agenda for further research is out-
lined to suggest priorities for the work. Secondly, the remaining research
directions are listed to aid in additional research directions.
Agenda for Further Research
Further research into the security and performance trade-off of FRVM would
involve porting the FRVM controller to a physical SDN-based network to
both refresh and obtain new results from a more realistic network setting. All
three controllers were written with Ryu, a network operating system, that is
used in real networks, therefore a large portion of the thesis code base would
be reusable. This research direction would involve configuring a physical
SDN-based network, rewriting a subset of the performance tests that were
written with Mininet [26], and collecting the performance and security re-
sults. There were many performance tests written for FRVM including those
to collect small delays, these should help to extend the performance testing
of FRVM. This would lead to more realistic results, more considerations for
real-world infrastructure, and the ability to test smaller delays.
Further Research Directions
• Demonstrate the disadvantage of a static mutation interval with Nmap.
Nmap offers an API, written in Lua [19], that could show how an at-
tacker could discover a static address mutation interval. With host dis-
covery, an attacker could track address mutations until a desired level
of confidence is reached.
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• Explore additional changes to FRVM and test the security improve-
ment against the results obtained in this thesis. Changes could include
adding port randomisation, random address mutation intervals, and
different methods to retain ongoing TCP connections.
• The key generation of FRVM should be improved with respect to speed
and attacker awareness. Potentially, this would improve scalability and
security of FRVM.
• Explore the overhead related to the Domain Name System (DNS) and






With the increase of societal reliance and threats against digital infrastruc-
ture, the importance of security has increased; however, traditional protec-
tions are static causing defenders an asymmetric disadvantage against at-
tackers. Moving Target Defence (MTD) can eliminate this asymmetric disad-
vantage by adding dynamics to protections. Flexible Random Virtual inter-
net protocol Multiplexing (FRVM) is an MTD technique designed to prevent
attacker reconnaissance and access through address mutation in conjunction
with address multiplexing. The security and performance trade-off of FRVM
was realistically evaluated on a virtualised network. As FRVM was deployed
alongside real-world protocols, issues with existing network infrastructure
were discovered.
The past literature detailed the numerous issues that adding dynamics to a
network can cause and revealed the lacking security and performance anal-
ysis of past address masking techniques, in terms of either statistical rigour
or realistic evaluation. With the knowledge that FRVM was theoretical, with
only analytical analysis, it seemed likely that there would be some issues
with existing network infrastructure. Additionally, analysis of FRVM on a
virtualised network would improve understanding of the technique, and
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future network-based MTD. This led to the following research questions:
what extra considerations will need to be handled to implement and deploy
FRVM? How does FRVM affect security scanning in terms of information
disclosure and scan duration? What is the effect of FRVM on a network’s
performance?
Whilst implementing and deploying FRVM, issues with a portless network
protocol, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), and router address assignment
were discovered and solved. Data was collected and analysed for the secu-
rity and performance of FRVM. Security testing involved scanning a SDN-
based network with Nmap, separate scans were conducted for each of the
SDN controllers. Many scans were taken to compare different scan types and
find the effect of different address mutation intervals. The results suggested
that address mutation was effective at obfuscating and prolonging network
scans although open ports could still be discovered without more protec-
tion. Further, address multiplexing was effective at further obfuscating and
prolonging the network scans. Performance testing involved measuring the
duration of file transfers over the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), at
different levels of network load. The results showed there is a significant
performance trade-off for mutating addresses although the additional cost of
address multiplexing is insignificant. The effect of many individual concur-
rent connections increases more for larger numbers of servers, suggesting a
possible scalability issue with the FRVM controller.
The thesis contributed realistic evaluation of the security and performance
of FRVM, along with the detection and solution of issues with existing net-
work infrastructure. The performance cost of address multiplexing on top of
address mutation is not significant whereas the additional security is greater,
this could lead future research to include address multiplexing, improving
security and anonymity. FRVM would force attackers to design complicated
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MTD-aware reconnaissance and access tools. Additionally, the comprehen-
sive methodology could aid future research in evaluating MTD protections
against reconnaissance and access. Finally, further work could be completed
on deploying FRVM on a physical network, to refresh results and collect
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